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Abstract 
    A lack of information regarding American foreign policy in the Middle East can lead to 
deleterious political decision-making. There are many people both in the civilian world and the 
world of government that view Middle Eastern related security issues through a sociocultural 
lens. This thesis portfolio seeks to assess the implications of American foreign policy in the 
Middle East as opposed to socio-culture. It places emphasis on the theory that American foreign 
policy contributes to anti-American antagonism. There are a few different methods by which this 
is measured. 
     
    First, this thesis will assess American military policy in the Middle East. Specifically, it 
analyzes the impact of American military policy in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan on Muslim 
public opinion. This is conducted by looking at numerous sets of data and public polls from 
different credible organizations, as well as secondary sources.  
 
    Second, socio-cultural sources are directly assessed in order provide evidence that 
American foreign policy is the primary driver behind anti-American antagonism. Writings from 
notorious anti-American figures and scholarly sources on Middle Eastern culture, are considered 
in order to measure socio-cultural based anti-American antagonism against anti-American 
antagonism driven by American foreign policy.  
 






    Third, the diplomatic consequences of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 
Iran Nuclear Agreement are assessed. Specifically, it looks at how European and Middle Eastern 
countries most relevant to the deal have more at stake than the United States. 
 
    The results of the 1st chapter conclude that American foreign policy in the Middle East had 
a negative impact on Muslim public opinion. The results of the 2nd chapter conclude that 
American foreign policy was a stronger motivator for anti-American antagonism than socio-
cultural issues. The results of the 3rd chapter conclude that other countries related to the Iran 
nuclear agreement had more at stake than the United States.	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Thesis Portfolio Introduction 
Ethnic diversity, a clash of cultures and nation states, terrorism at home and abroad, shifting 
balances in global energy needs, and controversial political and military initiatives, make 
American foreign policy in the Middle East a topic that touches most Americans. Foreign policy 
influences American national security as well as energy, immigration, and the economy. Foreign 
policy encompasses more than just military strategy. It also encompasses diplomacy, intelligence 
and the economy. These four aspects of foreign policy are what make up the DIME (diplomacy, 
intelligence, military, economy) in security studies. This thesis portfolio reviews different parts 
of the DIME in the Middle East. It mainly looks at the military and two different aspects of 
diplomacy.  
Specifically, for the military angle, the first thesis looks at how American military policy in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria impacts Muslim public opinion. The second thesis focuses on the 
diplomatic angle and compares whether it was a propagation of American culture (a form of soft 
power) or military policy (a form of hard power) that was the cause for antagonism toward 
America. The third thesis focuses on how the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) affected selected countries that had the most at stake. 
While a thorough understanding of the Middle East requires sensitivity to a broad range of 
diverse cultural and historical material, it is also clear that a lot about the Middle East is 
misunderstood. It can be better understood by looking at detailed research; research that often 





II are very distinct topics, but both topics can help to address the important question of why a 
significant amount of terrorism emanates from conflicts in the Middle East.  
Safety and security concerns have created new priorities globally due to terrorism rooted in 
Middle Eastern conflict. Getting on a train; flying on a plane; shopping at a market; taking a 
walk on the street; going to a nightclub and other commonplace aspects of life, have all been tied 
to a potential for terrorism. It is unnecessary to list all the attacks that have occurred that fit these 
criteria. Middle East Terrorism affects day-to-day life and is now pervasive, ubiquitous and a 
reoccurring global phenomenon. This is not to discount other types of terrorism, but this thesis 
portfolio focuses specifically on tensions rooted in Middle Eastern conflicts. 
Terrorism with ties to Middle East conflicts is more complicated than domestic forms of 
terrorism. When abortion clinics and doctors were being attacked, people understood quite 
simply that the terrorists were opposed to abortion. When white Supremacists commit an attack, 
most people have at least a general understanding of white supremacist ideology—that is, they 
think white people are supreme and they often admire Nazis. However, when there is an attack 
linked to the Middle East, people often don’t understand the motive at all, or more likely, they 
have a misperception of the entire picture. Part of this research can help both the average person 
to understand what motivates terrorism as well as the academic who may argue it is strictly 
rooted in religion and culture. Thesis I and II are the segments of the portfolio that address the 
issue parsing a variety of factors that motivate antagonism and terrorism. 
Thesis I focuses on the military aspect of American foreign policy, which is a pivotal factor 
to examine when exploring the motives for terrorism. Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria are the 
countries obviously relevant to military interventions in the Middle East, although the United 





States is also involved in operations in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Libya and other countries. It is 
likely that these other operations throughout the Muslim world would have an impact on Muslim 
public opinion as well, but it was beyond the scope to focus on these countries lest the entire 
thesis portfolio strictly on military policy.  
Thesis I is straightforward: It explores various sets of data in order to gauge Muslim public 
opinion on American military policy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.  The data came from Pew 
Research, Brookings and other organizations. Specifically, the data was assessed to determine 
whether American military policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria has a negative, positive or 
neutral impact on Muslim public opinion. Certain factors had to be isolated and those are 
discussed within the Thesis chapter itself. These factors mainly have to do with political strategy 
and direct bias. With these factors in consideration, the research helps to determine the impact 
that military action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has had on Middle Eastern public opinion. 
The data helps to illuminate some of the root causes of terrorism.  The knowledge that can be 
derived from Thesis I aligns well with the transition into what is discussed in Thesis II. 
Thesis II places emphasis on the military aspect as well, but it does so in a different way. 
Thesis II focuses less on the numerical data. It assesses varying motives underlying antagonism 
to America, particularly western cultural diffusion or military policy.  
The published works of multiple relevant perpetrators of political violence and scholars are 
assessed in order to gauge which had more of an influence on antagonism toward America. 
Writings from Edward Said, Osama bin Laden, and Hassan Nasrallah are some of the specific 
sources used to help make this determination. Some of the sources were more straightforward to 
analyze than others. For example, when looking at Osama bin Laden-who to this day is probably 





the primacy of motivations are not clear cut. His writings evince hatred influenced by cultural 
clash and military policy. In what bin Laden called his “Letter to America” he lists, in what 
appears as order of importance, his grievances with the America and the West. This Thesis 
simply adds and compares how many statements he made referencing a negative view on culture 
versus how many statements he made referencing a negative view on American foreign policy 
and military interventions. This is a simple but effective method and it was only necessary for 
bin Laden’s letter. Other sources are assessed more straightforwardly. The bin Laden assessment 
was compiled and weighed along with all the other data, and this drives the conclusion reached 
in Thesis II. 
Thesis II sets out to determine what is contributing more to anti-American antagonism: 
American foreign policy and intervention or American culture? The sources were analyzed and 
assessed to determine whether the hate being espoused by the writer was more so motivated by 
an opposition to American culture or American foreign policy. Simply, were the writers 
discussing issues such as their opposition to a lack of religion and other Western cultural trends 
or a disagreement over actions that the American government has taken? Or did they discuss a 
combination of the two such as bin Laden had? 
Thesis III remains within the same broad subject of American foreign policy in the Middle 
East, but it takes a distinctly different focus from both Thesis I and II. Thesis III focuses on 
American diplomacy in the Middle East during the Trump era, specifically on Trump’s 
withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action also known as the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement, and sometimes referred to herein as “the deal”.  It examines in detail the 
implications for some of the more relevant countries connected with and impacted by the 





countries--the permanent body of the UN Security Council) were opposed to Trump’s 
withdrawal from JCPOA.   A difference in each country’s relationships with Iran and the United 
States is assessed. Other Middle Eastern countries that the JCPOA impacted are also examined 
briefly, including Israel and the Gulf states. 
In order to make an assessment on American diplomacy as it compares to other relevant 
parties related to JCPOA, the different relationships of the countries involved is meticulously 
analyzed. Conclusions are drawn based on a number of factors that are assessed: partnerships, 
alliances, conflicted histories, economic opportunities and security implications. Factors are 
assessed and compared among the relevant countries to determine how much stake each nation 
has in JCPOA. This comparison is what makes it possible to decide how important JCPOA is to 
the United States as compared to other relevant nations. It helps to answer multiple questions of 
why the United States was so inclined to withdraw from the deal; why some countries supported 
the withdrawal; and why others opposed the withdrawal. These decisions, relationships and 
context enable a better understanding of the multi-party deal that is JCPOA, and also the broader 
context of the geopolitical relations that shape the world we live in. 
 The negotiations over JCPOA give another world stage platform to ideologically competing 
powers. The ideological clash between China, Russia, and their authoritarian allies and the 
United States along with its mostly democratic allies is a paramount strategic issue in current day 
foreign relations. JCPOA highlights another hot point in this clash of ideologies with China and 
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It is often assumed that U.S. and its military policy throughout the Islamic world are held 
in great disdain. The U.S. has intervened on one level or another throughout many countries in 
the Middle East, but this report will focus specifically on Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.  The 
hypothesis being proposed here is aligned with the common thought: That U.S. military policy in 
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan has a negative effect on the Islamic world’s public opinion of the 
United States.  
 
Numerous factors affect this research. For one, there are not always vast amounts of 
public opinion polls available from war torn areas. Some are available, but not as many as from 
areas that aren’t at war. Therefore, this research will take into consideration public opinions of 
the entire Islamic world and not just the public opinion of Iraqis, Syrians, and Afghans 
themselves.  
 
This research will explore different avenues related to the United States' military policy 
effect on public opinion of the Islamic world. This will include analyses of opinions related to 
conventional warfare and drone warfare. It will also assess the level of Islamic support for 
terrorist groups that the U.S. or U.S. backed entities are battling in order to achieve a multi-
faceted and nuanced perspective as to how U.S. military policy in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan 
effects the public opinion of the Islamic world. This research method will also include 
parameters for distinguishing between general or cultural opposition to U.S. policy as compared 





1.2. Literature Review 
The central theme assessed in this literature review will be the topic of U.S. military 
policy in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Specifically, we will look at research on how U.S. 
military policy in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan affect public opinion of the Islamic world. The 
review will be organized around the three different countries in question as well as the different 
schools of thought related to my hypothesis. My hypothesis is that U.S. military policy in Iraq, 
Syria, and Afghanistan has a negative effect on Islamic public opinion. Therefore, the three 
schools of thought will basically be those that consider a negative effect, a positive effect, or an 
indifferent effect.  
1.3. Negative 
  A worldpublicopinion.org poll shows that Afghan opinion of U.S. forces decreased from 2005 
to 2006.1 This decrease has a cause. If the initial invasion of Afghanistan didn’t cause this sort of 
drop then there could be something particular regarding U.S. military style or strategy that was 
opposed. It was also noted in this study that a majority of Afghans would prefer economic 
assistance over military assistance. Additionally, there was a correlation between disapproval of 
Afghanistan’s Reconstruction and disapproval of United States forces. Thirty-five percent rated 
the progress of reconstruction as fair and thirty-two percent rated it as poor. It is difficult to 
succeed in a rebuilding process when the war hasn’t stopped yet.   
A 2009 Council on Foreign Relations public opinion poll yielded mixed results. Certain 
statistics from the polling would indicate a negative perception of U.S. policy.2 When 
respondents were asked their opinion of Al Qaeda, some countries had numbers that weren’t 
insignificant. Measuring support for Al-Qaeda can arguably be an indirect way to prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Weber, Stephen. "Afghan Public Opinion Amidst Rising Violence." World Public Opinion.org. 
https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/10120/Afghanistan_Dec06_rpt.pdf?sequence=4.	  






opposition to U.S. policy. Respondents were also asked how they felt about Osama bin Laden. 
These numbers were even higher than support for Al-Qaeda and would likely reflect inherent 
disapproval of U.S. military policy. When respondents were asked if the U.S. war in Iraq has 
increased or decreased the likelihood for terrorism around the world-Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and 
Indonesia all had strong majorities saying chances for terrorism had increased.    
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Figure 1.2. World opinion on terrorism.  Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed August 08, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-
opinion-terrorism. 
 
An article from Foreign Policy Magazine references a Center for Strategic Studies in 
Jordan survey regarding Jordanian approval of foreign intervention in Syria. It notes that only 
five percent of Jordanians approve of foreign intervention in Syria.3 Jordan has been heavily 
impacted by the refugee crisis and this is certainly influencing its opinion. 
A study referenced by the Foreign Policy article from the Arab Center for Research and Policy 
Studies reflects opposition to both Assad and foreign intervention. 82 percent of those polled 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Lynch, Marc. "Snapshots of Middle East Public Opinion." Foreign Policy. September 11, 2012. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/11/snapshots-of-middle-east-public-opinion/.	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A 2014 study conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy polled participants 
from Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, as well as Syrian refugees. 
This research was conducted by doing 5,100 phone interviews. The study found that a significant 
percentage of Arabs oppose coalition led bombings of ISIS.5 The approval ratings of ISIS aren’t 
as high as those who oppose the U.S. coalition led bombings. This evidences that much of the 
Arab disapproval towards the U.S. is linked to its military policy and comes from regular people 
more so than extremists. However, it should be noted that there is a strong overlap between 
military policy and extremism. It is often military related issues that can motivate terrorism. 55 
percent of ISIS supporters tended to support ISIS due to reasons such as “its preparedness to 
battle the West; its opposition to Iran and the Syrian and Iraqi regimes; or its purported support 
for the Sunni Muslim community in the Levant.”6 Only 13 percent of ISIS supporters supported 
ISIS on religious grounds. The latter includes the supporters who disapprove of the U.S. 
regardless of its policy because their motivation for opposition is cultural and religious, but they 
are the minority. 73 percent of those polled rated U.S. foreign policy in the region as either 
negative or somewhat negative. These numbers correlate strongly with a policy influence for 
opposition more so than a cultural or religious influence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  "Arab Public Opinion on ISIL and the Coalition Against ISIL." Dohainstitute.org. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab_Public_Opinion_on_ISIL_and_the_Coalition_against_ISIL_the_Full_Report.pdf.	  











Figure 1.4. Arab public opinion on ISIL and the coalition against ISIL. Dohainstitute.org. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab_Public_Opinion_on_ISIL_and_the_Coalition_against_ISIL_the_Full_Report.pdf. 
 
A 2014 Pew Research study assessed worldwide opinion concerning U.S. drone policy 
and opposition was widespread, especially among Muslim majority countries. High numbers of 
Muslim majority countries were opposed. Also, the U.S. favorability ratings seem to correlate 
downward parallel to an increase in U.S. military activity for many Muslim countries.7  This can 
correlate with both the initiations of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars themselves, as well as troop 
expansions within those wars. Some of these trends are more pronounced than others, but they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  "Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image." Pew Research Center's Global 
Attitudes Project. July 14, 2014. Accessed August 08, 2018. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-
surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/.	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all follow the same downward trajectory. The only explicit relevant similarity between the 
countries is the influence that U.S. foreign policy has on each of them. While there are many 
U.S. foreign policies that have a big influence on the Middle East, such as energy policy or 
economic policy, military policy is arguably the most dominant in terms of its impact on Islamic 
public opinion. There is arguably a strong overlap between those three policy sectors, but the 
most impactful in terms of creating negative opinions of the U.S. seem to be those motivated by 











Table 1.1. U.S. favorability 
 
 
A 2016 Arab Center Washington DC study (“2016 ACDC”) polled people from Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and 
Tunisia. The 2016 ACDC reflects high disapproval of U.S. military policy.8  In each country 
where the U.S. or a U.S. ally conducts military action the U.S. has a high disapproval rating.  A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






striking 82 percent of respondents believe the U.S. poses a threat to the stability of the Middle 
East. The only country with a higher threat to stability ranking is Israel at 89 percent. 
  
  
Figure 1.6. The 2016 Arab opinion index. Arab Center Washington DC. Accessed August 9th, 2018. http://arabcenterdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/2016-Arab-Opinion-Index-Executive-Summary-for-web.pdf.   
 
This research also studied general views of the Arab Spring on a country-by-country 
basis. Iraq was overall 57 percent positive towards the Arab Spring.  Some countries where 
revolutions actually took place, like in Tunisia and Egypt, were even more supportive. In U.S.-
backed Jordan, however, only 22 percent of those polled were positive towards the Arab Spring. 
58 percent of Arab interviewees are said to blame the existence of ISIS on policies of foreign 
powers. The U.S. led invasion of Iraq is probably the primary event responsible for driving that 
ubiquitous viewpoint. 
The Arab Center Washington DC conducted a public opinion survey in conjunction with 
the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies based out of Doha, Qatar in 2017. They polled 
in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, and Lebanon. The research 





the Middle East. 9 It is noted in this research that there was a strong correlation between opinion 
of the United States with age and education. The younger and more educated a respondent was 
the likelier they were to support the U.S. The quantitative difference between more general Arab 
views of the U.S. and Arab views of U.S. foreign policy is crucial. It shows that even among 
those respondents that dislike U.S. foreign policy, there are many Arabs that still approve of 
Americans themselves. It could be argued that if there were not a negative foreign policy 
influence, the general Arab approval of Americans would be even higher. There’s also a likely 
negative shift in Arab public opinion towards U.S. foreign policy and possibly Americans as 
well, due to some of Trump’s Middle Eastern policies, for example, the Trump Administration’s 
move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  
 
Figure 1.7. Arab attitudes toward President Trump and his Middle East policies and positions ACW. ACW. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
http://arabcenterdc.org/survey/arabs-opinion-trump-oct-2017/. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Figure 1.9. Arab attitudes toward President Trump and his Middle East policies and positions ACW. ACW. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
http://arabcenterdc.org/survey/arabs-opinion-trump-oct-2017/. 
 
An aggregate of 61 percent of Arab people that were polled view Trump’s policies in the 
Middle East as either very negative or somewhat negative. When Arab people were polled on 
Trump’s policies in Iraq and Syria, the disapproval was high. Disapproval of Trump’s policies 





presidential policy change and public opinion ratings.
  
Figure 1.10. Arab attitudes toward President Trump and his Middle East policies and positions ACW. ACW. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
http://arabcenterdc.org/survey/arabs-opinion-trump-oct-2017/. 
 
A 2017 Zogby Research poll meticulously examined the public opinions of seven Arab 
countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan Palestine, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq) as well as Iran 
and Turkey. A majority sees the U.S. role as negative in all countries except Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, and Turkey.10 In the case of the U.S. role in Iraq, the U.S. only gets a majority positive 
score from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Respondents were polled about President Trump’s 
policies and again most countries displayed negative majorities, with only Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, and Turkey registering positively. This research greatly conflicts with Brookings research 
that has 95 percent of Saudi Arabia answering that the U.S. intervention in Iraq would bring 
about less democracy, that is, unless some of those polled support less democracy in Iraq. It is 
important to keep in mind that discussion of the propagation of democracy does not always have 
a positive tone in the Muslim world. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






 A Brookings Institution article cites a study that polled over 3,000 participants and 
concludes that the view of the United States is mostly negative, and that this view is mostly 
based on attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy. Brookings released these findings a few months 
after the U.S.-Iraq war began. When questioned about whether the war in Iraq would bring about 
more or less democracy, the majority of those polled said it would bring less.11 When asked 
whether the U.S- Iraq war would bring about more or less peace, the responses were 
overwhelmingly negative. These numbers are claimed by Brookings to be some of the most 
negative in recent history. They also claim the results to be largely influenced by deep seeded 
opposition to the Iraq war, to the U.S. policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the 
suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the U.S. for oil. 
Table 1.2. Will the U.S.-Iraq War mean more democracy or less democracy in the Middle East? 
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  Telhami, Shibley. "Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq: Postwar Prospects for Changing Prewar Views." Brookings.  






Table 1.3. Will the U.S.-Iraq War mean more democracy or less democracy in the Middle East? 








Lebanon 9% 79% 10% 3% 
Egypt 5 79 13 2 
Saudi Arabia 5 91 3 0 
Jordan 4 60 30 7 
UAE 3 76 19 2 
Morocco 1 89 8 2 
 
Telhami, Shibley. "Arab Public Opinion on the United States and Iraq: Postwar Prospects for Changing Prewar Views." Brookings. July 28, 
2016. Accessed August 08, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/arab-public-opinion-on-the-united-states-and-iraq-postwar-prospects-for-
changing-prewar-views/. 
 
 How the U.S. is portrayed in the Arab media was assessed in a joint study between 
Professors from Qatar University and University of Louisiana.  A Zogby poll was cited in this 
study in which Arab participants were asked what they thought of when they heard the word 
“America”; most responded that they associate America with unfair policies.12  The study cites 
an Arab public opinion poll by Telhami, which found that U.S. foreign policy was a bigger 
influence on Arab opinion than U.S. values.  U.S. policy was the determining factor for at least 
five countries. When participants were asked how America could remedy this problem they 
mostly responded with different iterations that America should be fairer. This study notes that 
general Arab hostility is linked to U.S. policy going back to the Gulf War, as well as the U.S. 
stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict. The United States has long been at odds with the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Nations and other international organizations regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Muslim 
world is largely the one being affected by the conflict, and it is largely at odds with U.S. policy 
as well. The Israel-Palestine conflict and other events or policies have a significant effect on 
Muslim public opinion.  
 
An interesting study was conducted using a methodology where scholars compiled 
different tweets and assessed what the general opinion was based on social media chatter.  This 
study was called “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Interventionism in Arabic Twitter Discourses”. It 
highlighted a few different schools of thought regarding anti-Americanism in the Middle East. 
One school of thought believes that Arab-Muslim identity has an innate opposition to the U.S. 
The other school of thought believes that anti-Americanism in the Middle East is mostly based 
on disapproval of U.S. foreign policy. The study acknowledged the Syrian chemical weapons 
attacks and how Twitter discourse differed before and after. Varied categories were represented 
including anti-regime, pro-regime, and general, but 87 percent had a negative response towards 
the U.S. before the chemical attack.  95 percent had a negative response after the chemical 
attack.13 Each of the categories signified a mostly anti-U.S. stance. The different categories of 
tweets were each anti-U.S. from different perspectives. Some supported Assad, others opposed 
Assad and others were indifferent, but a large majority all opposed the U.S.. The Twitter study 
showed that even when monitoring tweets from the anti-Assad camp prior to the chemical 
weapons attack in August 2013, there were still 350 percent more anti-U.S. tweets than pro-U.S. 
tweets. After the chemical weapons attack there were 1200 percent more anti-U.S. tweets than 
pro-U.S. tweets.   
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The worldpublicopinion.org poll taken in 2005 showed that Afghans had an 83 percent 
favorable view of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In 2006, the same poll revealed that Afghans had a 
75 percent favorable view. The numbers did decrease, but ultimately were still very high. Both in 
2005 and 2006, roughly nine in ten of Afghans said they were opposed to the Taliban. In 2005, 
82 percent of Afghans supported overthrowing the Taliban government. In 2006, 86 percent of 
Afghans supported overthrowing the Taliban government.14 These numbers don’t fluctuate much 
overall and seem to mostly reflect a dislike of the Taliban more than anything else. Since the 
goal of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was to overthrow the Taliban, agreement with that goal 
and disapproval of the Taliban arguably is the basis for support of U.S. actions, at least in this 
specific case. 
The 2009 Council on Foreign Relations poll also revealed reactions towards terror groups 
that may indicate support for U.S. policy. 29 percent of Afghans believe the U.S. war in Iraq may 
have decreased the likelihood for terrorism. Most countries had significant negative responses to 
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their views of Al-Qaeda. This doesn’t necessarily correlate to their opinion of U.S. policy. 
However, it’s still worth noting that 82 percent of Turks, 35 percent of Egyptians and 
Indonesians, and 72 percent of Lebanese have negative views of Al-Qaeda. 68 percent of Turks, 
20 percent of Palestinians, and 26 percent of Indonesians have a very negative or somewhat 
negative view on Osama bin Laden.15 
A Washington Post/ABC News/BBC/ARD face-to-face survey in 2010 showed that more 
than six in ten Afghans supported U.S. forces being in the country. The survey noted that 
“majorities” of Afghans see progress in the training of Afghan security forces and the related 
obstruction of Al-Qaeda.16  Also, it is important to note that Afghans have had so many powers 
shifts over the last few decades that they are known to very carefully strategize their political 
support based on who they believe holds the power. This is why some Afghan tribes are known 
to have supported both the Soviet backed government and later the Taliban. In Afghanistan, 
politics is very much a game of musical chairs associated with power grabbing.. This is 
something that obviously plays a influential role in public opinion. 
 
The 2014 Arab Center for Research and Policy polling calculated much different 
numbers compared to the 2016 Arab Center Washington DC study. The support for strikes 
against ISIS seem to correlate more closely with a dislike of ISIS in this study than it does in the 
2016 study that will be examined later. It is significantly higher. The numbers show quite a high 
level of support for U.S. strikes against ISIS, but it’s important to consider the influential factors 
of why these demographics would support U.S. military policy. Some of the people being polled 
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have an inherent bias because they are themselves directly involved in some of the conflicts 
related to the polling. Also, ISIS is largely disliked.   
 
 
Figure 1.12. Arab public opinion on ISIL and the coalition against ISIL. Dohainstitute.org. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab_Public_Opinion_on_ISIL_and_the_Coalition_against_ISIL_the_Full_Report.pdf. 
 
The 2014 Pew Research study assessing U.S. drone policy (discussed above in the 
Negative section) did have low double-digit support in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh. There 
were also some countries whose favorability rating of the United States went up in correlation 
with a continuation of U.S. military policy in the Middle East. Lebanon, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
all scored an increase of U.S. foreign policy approval correlated to continuing U.S. military 
action.  It’s also notable that in 2014, Bangladesh had a 76 percent approval rating of the U.S.17 
Unsurprisingly, none of these countries are directly affected by any of the U.S. military policies 
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in Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan, unless they are affected in such a way that parts of their population 
have a politically or strategically motivated reason to support U.S. military policy. For example, 
there are no U.S. troops in Lebanon but the U.S. troops in Iraq, and especially Syria, still have a 
significant effect on Lebanon’s geopolitical stability. Since Lebanon has a large Shia and 
Christian population it is more likely to be against radical Sunni Wahhabi groups that the U.S. is 
fighting, and therefore is also more likely to support U.S. actions. 
The Arab Center Washington DC and Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2017 
Public Opinion Survey based out of Doha (See numbers at the Negative section), found that a 
non-majority but significant number of Arab people supported U.S. foreign policy. General 
perceptions of the United States were rated even more positively. Arab perceptions of the 
American people themselves averaged out to a relatively high majority.18 These numbers seem to 
evidence a distinct correlation in the difference between opposition to U.S cultural values (or the 
U.S. generally) in contrast with opposition oriented to U.S. policy and initiatives. 
The 2017 Zogby Research poll did have positive responses constituting a majority 
concerning U.S. policy in at least a few countries. The U.S. role in Syria is seen by a majority as 
positive in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. The U.S. role in Iraq is seen by a majority as 
positive in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. U.S. policy in the Middle East under Trump only had 
positive reactions from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey.19 These are Sunni countries and 
they therefore have more of an inherent bias in opposing the Iranian backed Syrian Government, 
and are in alignment with the U.S. position. There are multiple possibilities concerning the 
reason for support in different areas from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey beside survey 
sample errors, but these differences would require further research to enable conclusions. 
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The neutral responses could be made up of people who either are uninformed or 
unconcerned about foreign policy. It can also be composed of respondents who were afraid to 
answer honestly. Lastly, some of the neutral responses may come from those who adhere to one 
of the traditional schools of thought concerning this topic. They may represent the school of 
thought that embodies a cultural opposition to the U.S., and consequently military policy might 
not have much more of an influence on their opinion. The statistics themselves are available in 
the data presented above, but are somewhat irrelevant to the argument that U.S. military policy 
and initiatives affects Muslim public opinion negatively. 
 
1.6. Literature Review Conclusion 
There wasn’t much peer-reviewed literature available. The review has so far leans 
towards supporting my hypothesis that U.S. military policy in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan 
causes a negative effect on Islamic public opinion. However, there have certainly been 
discoveries that conflict with the hypothesis. For instance, Islamic public opinion, specifically 
the opinion of Afghans themselves, seems to be more positive than I would have expected. U.S. 
military policy in Iraq seems to be more explicitly opposed by Muslims than the other conflicts. 
However, there is some evidence so far showing that negative public opinion of the U.S., related 
to Afghanistan and Syria, could much more be linked to the strategy and style of military policy 
being implemented, as opposed to strictly the fact that the U.S. is involved at all. Part of my 
further research will possibly entail trying to delve deeper into the nuance of why public opinion 
on U.S. military policy in Syria, and certainly Afghanistan, seems to be a bit more complicated 








To understand whether U.S. military policy has a negative effect on Islamic public 
opinion, all biases must be considered. Empirical data is crucial, but certain nuances must be 
considered when examining the data. For example, Turkish opinion may be impacted by the U.S. 
stance on issues related to the Kurds. Palestinian opinion and some others may be affected by the 
U.S. stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is mostly these types of dynamics that led a 
Council on Foreign Relations article to note: “the United States is viewed in Iraq as either [an] 
indispensable broker or main irritant to the political process underway.” 20 Sunni-Shia relations 
certainly impact this statement, and whichever sect the U.S. is seen as not supporting 
governmentally and militarily will inherently feel disenfranchised, and therefore more likely 
opposed to U.S. policy. The Sunni Shia divide could possibly explain the 2017 Zogby Research 
poll that calculated Iraqi opinion of U.S. policy in Iraq and Syria totally even on Iraq and nearly 
even on Syria. Iraq’s first post war civilian Defense Minister Ali A. Allawi alleges, “…most of 
the Shi’a went along with the occupation for the time being. The Sunni Arabs were another 
matter.”21   However, that pattern doesn’t seem evident throughout many other Muslim countries. 
Therefore, all political implications are to be evaluated to the greatest degree possible in order to 
determine how they might influence, shape and weigh upon Islamic public opinion on U.S. 
military policy and the U.S. itself. 
 
This research doesn’t revolve around determining the motives behind U.S. policy. Even if 
a topic engenders a range of subjective opinions, it doesn’t necessarily impact that topic’s ability 
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to sway public opinion. According to a survey cited by Noam Chomsky, conducted by a 
University of Maryland professor, roughly 95 percent of the Middle East believes the U.S. 
invaded Iraq in order to control Iraqi oil and the Palestinians.22 When motives for foreign 
intervention are distrusted from the start, it’s not unexpected that those who have the distrust 
would be even more opposed as troops and casualties increase.  U.S. troop deployment levels in 
Iraq reached 160,000-170,000 troops at their peak.23  A study cited by the Washington Post, 
shows that there were roughly 405,000 civilian deaths24 and other estimates are even higher. 
 
So, not only is a negative influence to be somewhat expected, it’s also borne out in the 
data. The 2016 Arab Center Washington DC poll questioned participants across twelve Muslim 
countries including Iraq, and found that 78 percent were opposed to U.S. policy in Iraq.25 The 
poll cited by Brookings from 2003 questioned participants from multiple Muslim countries on 
whether or not the U.S. war in Iraq would bring about more peace and democracy. Every country 
polled had majorities, some very high, reflecting a widespread belief in the region that the war 
would bring about less democracy and peace. Some of the most telling evidence corroborating 
that the U.S. policy and intervention in Iraq negatively affects Islamic public opinion comes from 
the 2014 Pew Research study, in which the public opinions of multiple Muslim countries 
correlate downward in parallel to an increase in U.S. military activity.  
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Of course, as one school of thought suggests, it’s undeniable that certain segments of the 
Islamic world do fall into the category of opposing the U.S. on religious or cultural values. 
Research reveals that answers from the Muslim world to direct questions about U.S. policy in the 
Middle East, correlate the timing and circumstances of the war with public opinion.  Factual 
data, and scholarly assessment further underscores that the majority of opinions held by 
participant Muslim citizenry are impacted by U.S. military policy and intervention, as 
distinguished from cultural or religious values that influence their assessments. 
 
While the majority of the research so far has leaned towards U.S. policy in Iraq having 
negative effect on Islamic public opinion, some has been positive. When U.S. troops first 
invaded and overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iraqis on the street were seen cheering.26 Much in the 
same way as those who oppose the legitimacy of a foreign intervention are more inclined to 
oppose the intervention itself, those who approve of the legitimacy of a foreign intervention are 
more inclined to support it. Strong arguments can be made against the invasion of Iraq based on 
the hypocrisy of previous U.S. relations with Saddam Hussein; Saddam Hussein was a brutal 
dictator, but such support can be rationalized as a sober choice among the lesser of many evils, 
and as such, that U.S. decision is only partially defensible.  If one considers the Anfal Campaign 
alone-- which of course was not Saddam’s only crime—where, conservatively, a minimum of 
50,000 Iraqi Kurds were killed27, it relegates Saddam Hussein to someone worth being 
overthrown.  
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There is data that supports positive public opinion effects of U.S. military policy in Iraq. 
The 2014 Arab Center for Research and Policy polling concluded that 75 percent of Iraqis 
support U.S.-Coalition led bombing campaigns. Majorities of Lebanese and Syrian refugees also 
supported the campaign. The 2017 Zogby Research poll enumerated a majority support in both 
the UAE and Saudi Arabia of U.S. military policy in Iraq. The 2009 Council on Foreign 
Relations poll revealed that 29 percent of Afghans believe the U.S. war in Iraq could have 
decreased the likelihood for terrorism.  According to the 2014 Pew Research study, U.S. 
favorability ratings in Lebanon, Palestine, Indonesia, and Malaysia seemed to increase roughly in 
correlation with the continuance of the U.S.-Iraq war.  
Much of this data supporting a positive impact of U.S. military policy can be easily 
explained by the aforementioned political implications and biases. For example, some scholars 
believe the Sunni Gulf states would have supported U.S. action in Iraq in order to topple the 
other strong Shite powers besides Iran.28 Some of the data, such as an increase of U.S. 
favorability among Indonesians suggests a causal connection to the U.S.-Iraq war.  The support 
for U.S. military policy having a positive effect that is not politically implicated, quantitatively 
pales in comparison to the support for it having a negative effect.  
 
1.7.2. Syria 
It’s difficult to pinpoint with certainty what the goal of the United States is in Syria. 
There is such chaos and confusion on the ground that there has been reports of Pentagon backed 
militias fighting CIA backed militias.29 However, the two most obvious main policy goals would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Lynch, Marc. The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East. New York: Public Affairs, 2017.	  
29 Hennigan, W.J., Brian Bennett, and Patrick J. McDonnell. "In Syria, Militias Armed by the Pentagon Fight Those Armed by the 







seem to be striking a balance between fighting ISIS and opposing the Syrian government, which 
is backed by Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah.  
  
The Arab Center for Research and Policy notes that 82 percent of Jordanians have the 
same goal that the United States arguably has: to topple Assad.  Yet, only 3 percent of Jordanians 
support foreign intervention as a means to do so.30 The 2017 Arab Washington DC Center 
polling determined that strong majorities of Arab people (63%) are opposed to Trump’s policies 
in Syria.31 In 2016, polling from the same organization determined a total of 77 percent were 
opposed to Trump’s policies in Syria. Again, it’s hard to tell exactly what those policies are. An 
article from the Guardian discusses how Trump had vacillated between five different strategies 
in two weeks. 32 One Trump policy in Syria is explicit:  he is fulfilling his campaign promise to 
“bomb the s**t” out of ISIS.  Newsweek reports that by September 9, 2017, the United States had 
already dropped more than two thousand more bombs than it did in all of 2016. Consequently, 
civilian casualties are said to have also increased along with the increased war against ISIS in 
both Syria and Iraq.33 An increase in civilian casualties obviously is going to have a strong 
negative effect on public opinion. Even while many have declared ISIS defeated, the fighting 
continues. A BBC article from July 2018 notes the U.S. led Coalition announced that during a 
strike against ISIS, in which over fifty people died, that at least twenty-eight were civilians.34 It’s 
practically a truism throughout scholarly terrorism literature that excessive levels of civilian 
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casualties caused by foreign forces will stimulate increased recruitment by terrorist 
organizations.  
The reaction to the 2013 Chemical weapons attack seems to have had a significant impact 
on public opinion. Obama had drawn a red line against chemical weapons attacks. Some critics 
say Obama was weak by not reacting, but it was actually Congress that voted down Obama’s 
proposal to respond with military force. 35 Either way, many Syrians considered this as a total 
betrayal. Marwan Hisham writes in his book Brothers of the Gun: A Memoir of the Syrian War 
that after the lack of a response “conspiracy theories were thriving and Islamists were filling the 
void.”36  
 
Quantitatively, it appears that a majority of studies show a correlation between an 
increase in foreign military policy and interventions, with increased disapproval from the Islamic 
public. But, in the case of not specifically sanctioning the use of chemical weapons, many 
Syrians and Muslims were upset that the West, particularly the United States, didn’t respond. 
The Twitter study showed that pro-U.S. comments decreased after the lack of a response to the 
chemical weapons attack, even if only by a little. The 2014 Arab Center for Research and Policy 
study showed an average of 59 percent favorability among the countries polled when asked if 
they support U.S. military strikes against ISIS. However, support decreased on average when 
participants were asked about using U.S. and Western ground troops to help fight ISIS. This 
research also shows that Lebanon supports U.S. strikes on ISIS by about 76 percent. 
Additionally, the 2017 Zogby poll showed that majorities of the UAE, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia 
support the U.S. role in Syria. When chemical weapons attacks happened again in 2018, Trump 
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decided to respond with strikes against Syrian military facilities.37 Considering the data, while 
keeping aside many arguments including how meaningful or effective the strikes were, it’s easy 
to make the point that in the specific context of responding to the use of chemical weapons, 
majorities of Muslims probably agreed with Trump’s military strikes.   
 
In Wendy Pearlman’s We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria, 
interviews reveal the brutality of the Syrian government. One of her interviewees tells a story of 
when the protests were first beginning: “ the American and French ambassadors attended the 
500,000 person demonstration in Hama. They were welcomed with enthusiasm”.38 Before they 
were at war, it seems that a shared common enemy had increased the positive effect U.S. military 
policy has had on Islamic opinion. Also, there is more evidence in Syria than in Iraq, that 
substantial amounts of disagreement over U.S. military policy are more related to strategy and 
civilian casualties, than strictly the fact that the U.S. is there at all. While of course the purely 
oppositional demographic exists as well.  
 
1.7.3. Afghanistan 
A 2009 ABC poll referenced in a study by Center for Strategic and International Studies 
notes that in 2005 83 percent of Afghans had a favorable opinion of the United States. By 2009, 
only 47 percent had a favorable rating of the U.S. One of the most cogent statistics also comes 
from the ABC poll: 25 percent of Afghans say violence against U.S. and Western troops can be 
justified, but when polling people in areas that have been bombed, 44 percent support violence 
against U.S. and western troops. It’s not surprising that areas that have been more heavily 
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bombed are more likely to agree with a violent response. This supports the notion both that 
military policy can have a negative effect on Muslim public opinion. Also, it reveals how civilian 
casualties during military campaigns can help to motivate support for violence, and therefore 
terrorism. 
 
It’s not difficult to fathom why public opinion in Afghanistan shifted. An assessment of 
Operation Enduring Freedom by Human Rights Watch reported that U.S. forces were subjecting 
the Afghan people to “excessive force during arrest, arbitrary arrest, and indefinite detention”. 39 
In his book No Good Men Among the Living, Anand Gopal, relates how U.S. forces attacked a 
school and a governor’s house and thereby eroded most U.S. support.40 Another more recent 
Human Rights Watch report from 2015, examining the Kunduz Hospital attack, concludes that 
the U.S. strike on the hospital “killed forty-two patients, care givers and medical staff, and 
injured dozens more.” These types of events would most likely have had a negative effect on 
public opinion.  
 
The statistics show most Afghans to be opposed to the Taliban. However, many Afghans 
are well aware of the unspoken history between the CIA and the Mujahideen, when they were 
fighting the Soviet Union, and the relationship of these Mujahideen figures to the foundational 
backbone of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In his groundbreaking work Taliban, Ahmed Rashid 
thoroughly examined how the U.S. played a balancing act with respect to their level of support 
for the Taliban, largely growing out the U.S.’s support for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He argues 
that the United States was at least acquiescently supporting the Taliban up until the late 1990s, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  ""Enduring Freedom" | Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan." Human Rights Watch. November 08, 2016. Accessed August 08, 
2018. https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/03/07/enduring-freedom/abuses-us-forces-afghanistan.	  






and that the first moment of public opposition came in November 1997 when Madeline Albright 
called the Taliban “despicable”. 41 Not long before that time, support for the radical elements that 
would ultimately evolve into the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was not acquiescent, it was explicit. With 
a history of both supporting fundamentalists as well as then using them as a reason to invade the 
country, leading to a long-lasting violent military occupation, it’s clear to see why this situation 
might not bode well with Afghans or Muslims. In an article from The Guardian, Nushin 
Abrabzadah, eloquently describes Afghan perception of the U.S. as “the proverbial cowboy that 
enters the town, dividing the locals into haters, admirers, and the undecided who keep their 
options open.”42 Ultimately, however,, any foreign power that is seen to divide a nation, is 
usually more likely than not to have more haters than neutrals and admirers. Meanwhile, Pew 
Research from 2009 and other studies, show that throughout the Muslim world, the proposition 
of  U.S. troops in Afghanistan seemed to be more unanimously opposed than favorability ratings 
attached to Afghanistan itself. 43  
 
Despite the presumed significant negative impact of U.S. military intervention in 
Afghanistan on Muslim public opinion, some Afghans have approved of U.S. forces being in the 
country. Polling from 2010 (ABC, Washington Post, ARD, et. al.) showed that more than six in 
ten Afghans approve of U.S. forces. There is other data that doesn’t mirror these numbers as 
closely but seem to corroborate Afghan support for U.S. military presence. Even if the degree of 
accuracy is slightly off, and support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan falls below a super majority, it 
is strong evidence of there being significant percentages of the population who feel positively 
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about U.S. military policy. Even though approval ratings decreased from 2005 to 2006, they 
seemed to have leveled out in 2010, according to the 2010 studies. However, again, these 
relatively high approval ratings can probably be attributed to political implications and bias. 
Many Afghans don’t like the Taliban anymore than U.S. forces do. Therefore, these segments of 
the population are more likely to support the U.S. than they would be under other circumstances. 
This is evidenced by the distinction between the higher public approvals of U.S. military policy 
in Afghanistan than in the rest of the Muslim world. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This research has shown that U.S. foreign policy, particularly military interventions, in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria does have more of a negative effect on Muslim public opinion than 
a positive effect.  The extent of the positive effects was notable, as well as surprising, often 
related to the specific military or political motivation involved. Usually, when the public opinion 
polling results came from participants further removed from the conflicts at hand, then the 
negatives would increase.  
 
It also has been proven based on this research that negative perceptions of the U.S. in the 
Muslim world are more based on U.S. policies and interventions than anything else. Multiple 
studies throughout the report corroborate this assessment. However, more research could be done 
on the minority of those who do culturally oppose the U.S. New research might try to determine 
whether the small percentage of cultural opposition comes more from religious extremists, or 
non-extremists with an opposition to cultural imposition-which is still arguably connected to 





American people should be further explored as well. This trend shows that soft power 
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This thesis will explore the issue of Western cultural diffusion and how much it 
influences anti-Americanism in the Middle East relative to the effects of American foreign 
policy. It will do so by contrasting the Clash of Civilization theory with different points of view 
from academic, State, non-State and terrorist sources which variously describe sociological, 
demographic and political influences in the Middle East. Contrary to the suggestion of President 
Bush following the 9/11 attacks, the thesis concludes that anti-American sentiment is fueled by 




On September 20th, 2011, nine days after the attacks of September 11th, President Bush 
addressed Congress. He sought to answer the question that was on so many American minds 
during that nationally trying time: Why us?  Why do they hate us? His answer was “they hate us 
for what they see in this chamber- a democratically elected government, their leaders are self-
appointed, they hate our freedoms- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom 
to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”44 These baseline freedoms are the catalyst of 
Western culture. So, could it really be that simple? That it is all about Western freedom and 
culture? This thesis will attempt to determine how accurate President Bush’s statement really 
was.   
 
  First, Western cultural values and Islamic cultural values are different. This difference is not 
only a conflict between two different forms of Abrahamic religion. In the West women have 
achieved near equality, LGBT rights are more accepted, use of alcohol and recreational drugs is 
permitted, as is open access to the Internet and diverse music genres. Comparatively, in many 
Islamic societies women’s status has not been equalized, LGBT rights are stigmatized, alcohol is 
prohibited, access to the Internet is restricted, and music genres are more limited. Western 
Christianity and Islam both have their own moral philosophies that can subsequently influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






culture in distinct ways. Religious beliefs influence cultural attitudes, and cultural attitudes frame 
societal norms. These beliefs and norms affect how sexuality, gender roles, music, the Internet 
and other issues are perceived. Pew Research revealed data evidencing a large cultural divide 
between Islamic and Western societies.45 For example, Sharia law is largely supported 
throughout many Muslim countries. Application of this law would lend support for stoning as 
punishment for adultery, a death penalty for leaving Islam, and corporal punishment for crimes 
such as theft. 46 Western values, on the other hand, avoid cruel and unusual punishments. 
 
There is also a lot of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. However, there is not a 
unanimous consensus on what causes this anti-Americanism. Some scholars, such as Samuel 
Huntington, believe that this anti-Americanism is rooted in a clash of cultures following Western 
cultural diffusion. Some others, such as Noam Chomsky, believe it is rooted in objections to the 
impacts of America’s exercise of its foreign policy. Additionally, there is also the possibility for 
a combination between these two causes. This thesis posits that Western cultural diffusion does 
not play a primary role in motivating Anti-Americanism. 
  
On the flip side, it is important to note that anti-Islamic sentiment in America is 
misplaced, and will become increasingly important as a consequence of demographic trends. 
Muslims are not a small minority group. Actually, Pew Research concluded that by 2050 almost 
30 percent of the world will be Muslim.47 As the Muslim population continues to grow, 
Westerners are going to be increasingly exposed to and interacting with Muslims. There is 
currently a lot of tension between Americans and Muslims. Much of the tension in the West 
revolves around misconceptions about terrorism, and what American people think the root 
causes of terrorism are. Islamophobic notions influence many Americans, such as that all 
Muslims are inherently intolerant people. A significant majority of Americans polled by Gallup 
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between 2007 and 2009 believed that Muslims don’t want peace, don’t accept other religions, 
and don’t accept races other than their own.48 This parochial view does not allow for an empathic 
understanding of the diverse Muslim people, or for a more balanced view of the ramifications of 
American foreign policy.  This viewpoint can both contribute to foreign policy blunders, and 
foreign policy blunders can instigate terrorism-in the turn of a vicious cycle contributing back to 
Islamophobia. Trying to find the primary cause for anti-Americanism reveals different 
perspectives.  There are those who believe the motivation of terrorism has nothing at all to do 
with the actions of the United States or the West, but simply to do with the fact that the Muslims 
are, as Orientalist Mark Twain put it, “ filthy, brutish, ignorant, unprogressive and superstitious.” 
49 More recently, controversial film “American Sniper” was heavily criticized for causing a spike 
in anti-Muslim sentiment. The film glorified Chris Kyle, an American sniper said to have the 
most ever kills, who also referred to Muslims as “savages in his memoirs. The American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination committee collected over 100 threatening messages early after the film’s 
release.50 While there is no evidence showing that a significant majority of Americans hold these 
views, the data still shows that Islamaphobia is not an insignificant issue. Clearly these racist 
characterizations need to be more carefully scrutinized as the world gets closer, more 
complicated, and more populated.  
  
The world has seen a great increase in Islamophobic hate crimes in the past few 
decades.51 Credible studies show a significant uptick in hate crimes. Crucially, ignorance is one 
of the main enablers of hate. A ubiquitous misbelief that violence emanating from the Muslim 
world is strictly rooted in Islamic culture obstructs a more nuanced understanding. Linking an 
alleged general propensity for violence to someone’s culture is a form of dehumanization. 
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2.3. Literature Review 
 Clash of Civilizations: Samuel Huntington references a quote from a book called Dead Lagoon 
by Michael Dibdin: “ There can be no friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are 
not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a 
century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, 
their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not be lightly forgiven.”52 Huntington 
agrees with this sentiment and calls out “statesmen and scholars” to pay attention to the 
“unfortunate truth in these old truths”. 53 
 
Samuel Huntington is essentially asserting that cultural, ethnic and religious identities are 
inherently opposed to one another. Therefore, according to this theory, there is simply no hope 
for understanding, peace, or diplomacy between the supposed natural cultural enemies. 
Huntington considers Muslims to be one of Western civilization’s enemies. He reveals a 
microcosm of his Clash of Civilizations theory concerning the Muslim world. He says that 
“somewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking 
Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an 
American airliner.”54 Huntington’s point here is that Muslim enemies might be adopting the 
more superficial aspects of Western culture, but they are fundamentally antagonistic to American 
society. Societies can dress the same way, listen to the same music, and consume the same 
products, but that doesn’t mean there is not still a deep-rooted cultural or civilizational clash.  
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, while controversial, is representative of a main 
school of thought in explaining the divide between civilizations.  Although, if Huntington’s 
theory were totally accurate, there would be polling which showed the Muslim people to be 
heavily antagonistic to the American people, as a people, apart from their policies. Most of the 
negative polling relates to the general opinion of America as a whole, which includes foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Huntington, Samuel. Clash of Civilizations. Simon & Schuster. New York. 1996. 
53 Huntington, Samuel. Clash of Civilizations. Simon & Schuster. New York. 1996. 





policy, or foreign policy itself. Some polling included in Thesis I supports quite the opposite 
conclusion of Huntington. It shows that Arabs have a mostly positive perception of Americans 
overall.  Also, there is Pew Research concluding that nine out of ten Muslim Americans are 
proud to be American. 55 Lastly, to share an important anecdote, I lived in the Arab world for 
four months, mostly in Jordan. I also traveled to Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, and Qatar. Unlike 
some, I never hid the fact that I was American.  I interacted in a notable way with dozens, if not 
hundreds of people. Their response to my being American was almost unanimously “I love you 
America” or a similar response. Only when we began to have conversations about foreign policy 
did they usually express disapproval. 
 
Figure 2.1. Arab attitudes toward President Trump and his Middle East policies and positions ACW. ACW. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
http://arabcenterdc.org/survey/arabs-opinion-trump-oct-2017/.  
 
 Islam and the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Theory: In Pippa Norris and Ronald 
Inglehart’s Harvard University paper, they analyze Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
theory. It’s relevant to review the scholarly literature that was published in response to Samuel 
Huntington’s famous theory. Huntington’s theory is almost akin to believing people are born and 
raised to be against one another. Norris and Inglehart do a good job in debunking this.  
Huntington’s theory is often used as an explanation for terrorism, but a more thorough 
understanding of terrorism can be gauged once it’s understood that the West is not hated strictly 
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because of a deeply rooted religious or cultural conflict. Understanding the more realistic motive 
for terrorism, such as foreign policy, allows us to better understand Muslim public opinion in 
general. 
  
 Orientalism: Orientalism is a famous work written by Edward Said which seeks to understand 
the means by which the “the Occident” views and treats “the Orient” in an imperious fashion.  
Said himself explains the ideology of Orientalism as “not a mere political subject matter or field 
that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse 
collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some ‘Western’ 
imperialist plot to hold down the ‘Oriental’ world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical 
awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts.”56  
A skewed perspective of the divide between the East and West is even mentioned by Said to take 
on different forms from different European countries. Orientalism acts as an obstruction of 
understanding between the ostensible East and West divide. Said’s Orientalism embodies 
somewhat of a Marxist viewpoint in that clarifying a true history of people allows for those 
people to have a better chance at living their lives in a contemporary context. He references 
Gramsci who says that “ The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what 
one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a historical process to date”. 57 This theory seems to 
apply more faults on the West than does Huntington’s theory.  
 
 From Said’s point of view Western cultural diffusion does play a role in anti-Westernism, and 
therefore anti-Americanism as well. However, the cultural diffusion in this case is imposed by 
imperial and colonial rule and it is not considered to be organic. Said believes it is tied directly to 
colonialism and imperialism, and particularly how the underlying ideologies transfer themselves 
through the propagation of cultural values by scholars and cultural influencers. He says that 
Arabs are “highly diversified consumers of a vast range of United States products, material and 
ideology”. 58 Additionally, at the time this book was written, the dominant radical trend in the 
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Middle East was nationalism as opposed to today’s terrorism. Said states “Since World War II 
Arab nationalism has been a movement openly declaring its hostility to Western imperialism.”59 
 
 
For Said, Orientalism causes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead of looking at the problems 
with the East, he looks at the problems that the West projects onto the East. Within Western 
culture stereotypes about the East are so prevalent, it is not surprising that these can lead to 
uninformed decisions being made about how west and east might coexist. To illustrate how 
ubiquitous and atavistic Orientalism is, Said even goes back to the time of Dante: he states that “ 
even though the Koran specifies Jesus as a prophet, Dante chooses to consider the great Muslim 
philosophers and King as having been fundamentally ignorant of Christianity.”60 
 
 
Said also mentions that he is indebted to Michael Foucault. Foucault helped pave the way 
to enable him to intellectually observe the effects of Imperialism.  The philosophical lens that he 
adopts from Foucault and others is essentially a strategy of studying Orientalism by studying the 
work of Orientalists. The Orientalists in this case are academics who study the East side of the 
East-West world paradigm, whether it is the study of foreign policy, economics, poetry or a 
number of other academic fields. 
  
This work is a notable and important counterweight to Clash of Civilizations on the 
political spectrum. Said notes how he himself grew up a colonial subject in two different British 
colonies-in the Mandate of Palestine and in Egypt.  Said’s sensitivity to the feelings of those who 
live under a colonial regime is instructive to understand how cultural imposition impacts 
Muslims. Insights gained by Said, as someone who lived under two different colonial regimes, 
adds an inimitable gravitas to the subject matter making Orientalism a unique and worthwhile 
source when exploring this subject.  
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 Full Text: bin Laden’s Letter to America: bin Laden’s letter explicitly reveals his motives for 
masterminding the 9/11 attacks. The letter is relatively detailed. Mostly, his condemnation of the 
West is centered on America’s foreign policy positions. One of his foremost concerns is 
unqualified American support for Israel and Israel’s mistreatment of the Palestinians, which is 
maligned throughout most of the Middle East.61  Bin Laden also alludes to conflicts in Kashmir, 
Chechnya, Iraqi sanctions, and many other contentious points of interest to justify his attacks.62 
 
Bin Laden focuses more on foreign affairs, but he does discuss cultural issues as well. He 
speaks of “usury” that is being practiced in the West and rails against homosexuality, drugs, 
gambling, the commodification of sex, corporate greed, and political corruption.63 Bin Laden did 
not really speak of any invasive cultural effect when it came to the sociocultural traits of 
America he disagreed with. The tone was more of a critical accusation on policy grounds. 
Certainly, more emphasis was placed on his fundamental disagreement with America’s Middle 
Eastern affairs as well as the West’s affairs in the Muslim world. 
 
Due to this letter, there is a clear understanding of what bin Laden was thinking when he 
set out to attack the United States. Various justifications and observations are included; one 
would assume in a hierarchical order sorting among issues that are most important to least 
important. Clearly there were cultural reasons included in the letter explaining why bin Laden 
perpetrated 9/11. The bin Laden letter partially aligns with Huntington’s theory in that there is a 
perceived cultural clash from bin Laden, but it differs in that it corroborates that American 
foreign policy is the most influential factor, as opposed to culture. 
 
 In examining bin Laden’s letter to America multiple important points relevant to the hypothesis 
can be discerned. Bin Laden prefaces the letter with a verse from the Quran that justifies fighting 
“non-believers”. Then, bin Laden places an initial emphasis of concern on American foreign 
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policy.64 He references American support for the establishment of Israel and calls it “one of the 
greatest crimes”.65 When responding to his self proclaimed introductory question of “why are we 
fighting and opposing you?” the very first substantive response is “you attacked us in 
Palestine”.66 The letter goes on to discuss the issues of Israel-Palestine further while explaining 
from his perspective both the ancient and recent history. After much focus on Israel-Palestine, he 
also expresses opposition to American military actions in Somalia, alleged American support for 
Russian actions against Chechnya, Indian actions against Kashmir, and Israeli actions against 
Lebanon. Additionally, on his concern for American foreign policy, he also rails against 
American oil policy in the Middle East as well as the Iraqi sanctions from the 1990s. Finally, 
throughout the remainder of the letter, there are also references to America’s dropping of nuclear 
bombs in Japan, Guantanamo Bay, opposition to the Algerian revolution, America “supporting 
the Manila Government against the Muslims in Southern Philippines”67, and accused war crimes 
in Afghanistan. 
 
After focusing much of the initial portion of his letter on American foreign policy, he 
eventually delves into his opposition to American culture as well.  The first cultural issue he 
pontificates on is religion itself as he attempts to proselytize America into Islam. He then 
continues to criticize America for “fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling, and 
trading with interest”.68 He calls AIDS an “American invention” and even brings up the Clinton-
Lewinsky scandal. Anti-Semitism intones much of his rhetoric about some of the political and 
economic issues he sees. He claims that it is Jewish control of “policies, media, and economy”69 
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 Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: It’s useful to review the 
writings of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, for the same reasons it’s useful to review 
Osama bin Laden’s letter. While bin Laden might have placed cultural issues lower on his list of 
grievances, there definitely were some strong references to these issues in his letter. Nasrallah’s 
writings and statements on the other hand-which make up a book of over four hundred pages- 
reveal no references to Western sociocultural issues. Instead he focuses meticulously on foreign 
affairs. His worries related to the West are mostly related to U.S. support for Israel, French 
involvement in Lebanon, the Iraq war and other issues. Therefore, it can be surmised that 
Hezbollah’s concern is not with Western cultural diffusion, but with its foreign policy. Hezbollah 
not only has strong representation in Lebanon, but they are also mainly backed by Iran. The main 
issues concerning Hezbollah can also be seen as a view into the thought processes of some 
Lebanese and Iranians, as well as Shiites. 
 
This source proves an interesting comparison in the viewpoints of two very similar 
groups. Bin Laden is the leader of a terrorist group from the Muslim world, and Nasrallah is the 
leader of a group from the Muslim world that is considered a terrorist group by many 
governments. Comparatively, they tend to agree on their bitterness over Western foreign policy, 
but Nasrallah does not have the same concern for sociocultural issues that bin Laden has. Both 
seem to view foreign policy in the forefront, but Nasrallah does not address cultural concerns.  
 
  Similarly to bin Laden, Nasrallah also repudiates American foreign policy quite assiduously. 
His writings and statements show that he was opposed to the Iraq war, and like bin Laden also 
believed America was just after oil.70  Unsurprisingly, since Hezbollah is believed by many to 
have formed in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, there is a significant amount of 
criticism aimed at the actions of “the Zionists and the Americans”. 71Nasrallah references 
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America’s violent history with Native Americans when he insists in a speech given in Beirut that 
“The American and Israeli administrations have to understand that Arab and Muslim 
populations, and the people of this area as a whole, are not the Red Indians, whom they can 
annihilate or isolate in the desert or on the mountains.” 72 Whereas bin Laden saw his conflict 
with America through a lens of global Jihad and referenced a dozen different foreign policy 
critiques as motives, Nasrallah’s writings and speeches covered in this book show a focus on 
issues Hezbollah is directly involved in; he does not speak out on anything else. 
 
 
 Media, Culture, and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State: This 
particular source provides us with a window into Iranian society. Iranian society is one 
considered to foster a significant amount of anti-Americanism. Iranian society can be better 
understood if one researches sources outside of the rhetoric that is expressed between the Iranian 
and the American government. This source takes Internet discourse or censorship, satellite 
television content, scope of music genres, feminism, and other issues all into consideration. 
When asking the question of how much Western cultural diffusion in the Middle East feeds into 
anti-Americanism, a useful exercise is to explore how governments in the Middle East respond 
to cultural encroachment. This study reveals how different institutions and forms of media inside 
Iran actually operate. There is a noticeable difference between the government and the general 
populace when it comes to support for Western culture. 
 
 Arab Public Opinion on American Policies, Values and People-Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives: This hearing was held on May 3, 2007 as part of the deliberations of the 110th 
Congress. It is a useful source to examine for a variety of reasons. It provides a direct assessment 
of the exact topic this Thesis explores. An authoritative body is conducting the assessment: the 
United States Congress. Also, the United States government is directly linked with the topic at 
hand. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 







  Throughout the hearing, many different sources of data are used such as the 9/11 Commission 
Report and polling data from the same organizations used in Thesis I, such as Pew and Zogby. It 
is noted by David Pollock during the hearing that the polling data discussed is serious, but has 
methodological flaws. The flaws include a lack of experimental details, demographic issues, 
timing, and cultural issues.   Additionally, some places, such as Iraq, are just difficult to conduct 
polling in.  
 
 Many different angles of Arab public opinion are discussed. This includes references to culture 
as well as foreign policy. It also includes dissent towards the view of George W. Bush on this 
issue. Each different body of Congress has its own bias based on the proportion of seats allocated 
to political parties, but this source yields a great opportunity to observe a high level debate on the 





The main method used to determine how much Western cultural diffusion affects anti-
Americanism in the Muslim world was to assess the different sources of relevant literature. 
Literature from differing perspectives was taken into consideration. Scholarly analyses such as 
from Said and Huntington were assessed as an authoritative overarch to the topic, however it was 
equally important to gather the viewpoints that come directly from other sources. The main 
query that usually concerns this issue of Western cultural diffusion and anti-Americanism in the 
Muslim world is to what extent does it motivate terrorism. Therefore, it was necessary to look at 
the opinions of the terrorists themselves. Another area where there is a high level of anti-
Americanism is Iran. Assessing Iran is different from assessing the terrorist groups because it 
required a more thorough exploration of the entire society; whereas, it was determined that 
assessing terrorist groups mainly required just reviewing what those groups themselves have said 







 Clash of Civilizations: Huntington’s theory supports the idea that Western cultural diffusion 
influences anti-Americanism. He states in chapter five that “the Islamic challenge is manifest in 
the pervasive cultural, social, and political resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world in the 
accompanying rejection of western values and institutions”. 73 Huntington’s theory seems to 
largely be based in the idea that Muslims believe themselves to be of a superior culture.74  
 
Huntington makes the claim that the resurgence of Islam has some similarities with 
Marxism.75 Marxism is an ideology considered to be largely in conflict with Western culture. It 
can be considered to inherently influence anti-Americanism; at the very least in the way it views 
the economy.  Similarly, it is asserted by Huntington that Islam has an inherent clash with the 
idea of a nation state.76 Religious forces and the “ummah” have more control over society than 
does a sense of nation or statehood. Therefore, these elements have more control over any 
potential democratic institutions as well. 
 
Huntington cites a lot of evidence to support his theory. He brings up wars that he refers 
to as “fault line wars” in which the proposed cultural clash between Islam and Judeo-Christianity 
plays out on the ground such as the Chechen-Russian wars, Armenian-Azerbaijani wars, and 
Yugoslav wars.77  Huntington also notes that many Muslims feel the same way as he does. 
 
Without assessing how legitimate Huntington’s viewpoint of cultural clash is, it can still 
be discerned that based on his school of thought anti-Americanism would not be motivated by an 
intentional cultural diffusion. The ideas structured within Huntington’s writings insinuate that 
this clash is organic. Nonetheless, this theory supports the idea that Western cultural diffusion 
plays a large role in anti-Americanism. 
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 Islam and the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Theory: This study maintains that while 
some of Huntington’s theories are correct, some are also false. It concluded that Huntington’s 
Clash of Civilizations theory was questionable because “Western and Islamic societies generally 
agreed on three of the four indicators of political values”.78 The one indicator of disagreement 
was the viability of theocratic governments, and it was not only the Muslim world that disagreed 
with the West about this.79  Note also that the report mentions that support for democracy is 
relatively strong in the Muslim world. However, democracy in the Muslim world can have 
consequences that lead to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood gaining power. Norris and 
Inglehart opine that the post 60s West is most certainly different from the Muslim world, but 
they also say that to call it a clash of civilizations “represents an oversimplification of the 
evidence”. 80It concurs that there is a clash of cultures between Islam and Judeo-Christianity. But 
it also found that according to their data, “Western and Islamic societies generally agreed on 
three of the four indicators of political values. Rates of approval for Democracy, as well as its 
functionality and level of governmental superiority, were very similar in Islamic countries as 
compared to Western countries.”81 Norris and Inglehart found the one difference to be the way in 
which people from Islamic and Western societies considered what role religious leaders should 
play in society.  
 
The study concludes by recognizing that there is a cultural clash, especially since the 
Western liberal and sexual revolution of the 1960s. However, it also insists that to consider a 
cultural clash as the main factor behind conflicts between the East and West is an 
“oversimplification of the evidence”. 82 
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 Orientalism: In this book, Said takes a different stance from Huntington. A lot can be distilled 
from the first few paragraphs in the introduction of Orientalism. Said states “The Orient was 
almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, 
haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.” He also calls Orientalism a 
“British and French cultural enterprise.”83 He asserts that the British and French “dominated the 
Orient and Orientalism; since World War Two America has dominated the Orient, and 
approaches it as France and Britain once did.”84 
 
In a sense Said is arguing that there has been an ages-long propaganda campaign waged 
against the East by the West, and that the propagandistic campaign is a direct element of Western 
hegemony. He doesn’t specifically touch upon a descriptive connection between Western 
cultural diffusion and anti-Americanism, but it is easy to infer by his use of words such as 
dominance, imperialism, and power, along with his ideas that what he is arguing is a cultural 
subjugation born out of imperialism. In order to deem this source irrelevant because it only 
observes the connection between Western cultural diffusion and imperialism as opposed to anti-
Americanism, it would have to be asserted that people generally appreciate subjugation. There 
are some colonized subjects who exploit the situation or fall under an optimistic colonial 
mentality, but it is not the norm. For example, only 16.4% of Filipino Americans polled felt 
fortunate about being previously colonized. 85 
 
 Full Text: bin Laden’s Letter to America: As is obvious by the length of each of these 
distinctive paragraphs on bin Laden’s letter, he focused significantly more of the letter on foreign 
policy. Overall, there were twenty-four different noted paragraphs on foreign policy, and there 
were twenty on cultural issues. As reviewed in the 2nd paragraph, bin Laden did have some 
cultural quarrels with the U.S., but not as many as he did with its foreign policy.  
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 Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: Nothing was found within 
this book relevant to how Western cultural diffusion could influence anti-Americanism; 
everything was related to foreign policy. As a consequence the absence of an articulation of 
cultural divisions supports this thesis statement. After analyzing four hundred and ten pages of 
writings and talks from the leader of Hezbollah, nothing was found evidencing that anti-
Americanism within Hezbollah, Lebanon, or the Shia religion is related to Western cultural 
diffusion. The results of bin Laden’s letter are somewhat mixed, but the result in Voice of 
Hezbollah is straightforward. 
 
 Media, Culture, and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State: There is a 
ban on satellite television in Iran, however the ban is reportedly not thoroughly enforced. The 
Iranian interior Minister is reported to have called satellite television a “cultural invasion by the 
enemy” and to have said “Western countries beamed satellite television to Iran to weaken 
people’s religious beliefs”.86 The music scene is said to be quite vibrant but some concerts are 
sanctioned and some are not. Since the Minister of Culture must approve the bands, many have 
to operate in clandestine fashion. Rock is the most popular genre, based on how often it is 
referred to in the study. 
 
It is quite impressive that there are more women graduating from university than men in 
Iran. In those universities, subjects such as “continental philosophy, critical theory literary 
criticism, and cultural studies”87 are common classes in the curriculum. This is significant due to 
the potential clashes with Islam ideology that these subjects engender.  
 
It is written in the Iranian Constitution that television is completely controlled by the top 
religious leader. It is stated that television is intended to be used for a propagation of Islam. Also, 
it is strictly forbidden to use it for anything “anti-Islamic”.88 
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How the Iranian government reacts towards a Western online presence can also be 
indicative of their view on Western cultural diffusion. This source reveals that the Iranian 
government had blocked 100 websites at the time the book was published. Some of those sites 
were blocked due to inclusion of American content. It is also reported in the source that they 
have “attempted to control the Internet by filtering net activity, arresting web designers, and 
enacting restrictions over the Internet”.89 
 
The book also focuses on a fundamentalist Shiite scholar from the 1970s named Morteza 
Motahhari. Motahhari was a part of the anti-Western anti-feminist movement that is considered 
to have shaped the contours of how Iranian society thinks on this issue. Motahhari’s ideology 
revolves around forced gender roles as well as other patriarchal ideas such as women needing a 
veil to insulate themselves from savage-like men who would not be able to contain themselves 
from committing rape if the woman were exposed. 
 
 Arab Public Opinion on American Policies, Values and People-Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives:  As addressed above, there are certain issues with the polling some of this 
discussion is based on, but it should still be considered credible data. It is stated early on in the 
hearing by Rep. Gary Ackerman that “anyone who has bothered to read the polling data coming 
out of the Middle East [will see] that the policies of the United States are overwhelmingly 
disliked.”90 He also notes that the 9/11 Commission Report placed heavy emphasis on foreign 
policy. These viewpoints align succinctly with the thesis statements of both Thesis I and Thesis 
II. 
 
 James Zogby, Senior Analyst of Zogby International is interviewed and he describes the style 
and results of the polling. He reports that American movies, freedom and democracy, and 
science and technology all had majority support in the Middle East. Low support was more 
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correlative with policies on terrorism, the Iraq War, the Palestinians, Guantanamo Bay, Abu 
Ghraib, or secret prisons.91 Zogby categorically states that “Overall, when you look at the 
importance of values and policies in determining attitudes toward America, they do not judge us 
by our values. 10 percent is the highest we get on that in Saudi Arabia. In almost every case, they 
judge us by our policies. It is not what we say about ourselves; it is how we treat them. That is 
the issue.” 92 
There were some results discussed that didn’t align with this thesis statement. General 
support for America was not as positive. Countries such as Jordan and Morocco had roughly a 
third of those polled in support of the United States, but overall support in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia was very low hovering around 10 percent. Also, there was very high support for the war 
in Iraq from Iraqi Shi’a and Kurdish communities-reportedly around 75 to 80 percent. Support 
for the war generally would represent a decrease in viability for this thesis statement, arguably 
placing more focus on Western cultural diffusion. But, it is important to note that there is a bias 
in this case, as those showing support for the war are those whom were most negatively impacted 
by Saddam Hussein. Lastly, there is also a general outlier. Zogby notes that Egypt is unusually 
opposed not only to policy, but to values as well. No conclusive reason why is offered for this 
result. 
 
This source evidenced more support for the thesis statement than it did opposition to the 
statement. As just revealed, there were some oppositional results. But those results were mostly 
in the context of James Zogby stating them, after having already stated that all the polling his 
company has done supports this thesis statement. 
 
2.6. Discussion 
 Clash of Civilizations: Samuel Huntington’s famous Magnum Opus ideologically opposes this 
thesis. Huntington delves into great detail in explaining what he sees as an inherent culture clash 
between “the East and West”, however he doesn’t give much credence to opposing viewpoints. 
For example, in his discussion of “fault-line wars” he only focuses on the divide among 
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societies, while ignoring the togetherness. He uses the Chechen-Russian wars, Armenian-
Azerbaijani wars, and the Yugoslav wars as evidence to support a culture clash. 93In fairness, the 
current epidemic of Islamist attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt would probably further bolster 
his argument were he alive. However, there are contradictory scenarios from multiple angles that 
conflict with his theory.  
 
First, take into consideration accounts from World War II in which Muslim Bosnians 
were responsible for protecting Jews from Nazis. According to a BBC article, 70 Muslims have 
been added to a list of honor at the official Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Israel dedicated 
to those people who took it upon themselves to defend Jews during the holocaust.94 The Muslims 
who did this were putting their lives on the line and they would not do so for a people whom they 
inherently clash with. Additionally, to draw from this same historical scenario, Nazis were 
mainly going after Jews. Yet, according to Huntington’s theory, all the world’s problems revolve 
around a culture clash. Jewish people operate religiously under the same Judeo-Christian 
umbrella as Christian people.  Huntington and many other scholars refer to “Judeo-Christianity” 
in that light for obvious reasons. So, if Huntington were accurate, Jewish people would never 
have been targeted. Possibly, Huntington would claim that anti-Semitism cancelled out that 
perspective, or is another mini clash against Christianity in and of itself, but Anti-Semitism is 
based out of the same core ideology that Huntington’s is: that is an emphasis between the us and 
them. In fairness, he had difficulty determining where exactly to categorize Jewish people. Also, 
the Nazis were opposed to the church in many ways and even used pagan symbols in their 
propaganda. 
 
Second, Noam Chomsky supports a similar perspective when highlighting a notorious 
incident that he often focuses on: the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. Oscar Romero 
was Archbishop of San Salvador, El Salvador and he was known to be a social justice advocate 
who opposed the government during a time of sectarian strife. El Salvadoran government death 
squads backed by the U.S. murdered him and everyone who was with him at the time. So, in 
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essence, you had a dominant Judeo-Christian government backing another Judeo-Christian 
government who brutally murdered a very popular Judeo-Christian Archbishop.95  According to 
Huntington’s theory, an incident like this should really only be happening if either Romero had 
been an Imam or if at least one of the two Judeo-Christian governments involved had been 
Islamic. Chomsky also opines that the United States is very closely allied with the most 
fundamentalist state in the world: Saudi Arabia. Why would the ostensible leader of the West-the 
United States- be so closely linked to such a strongly authoritarian Islamic theocracy such as 
Saudi Arabia if cultural divide is what dictates the world’s most pressing issues? Does 
Huntington’s theory simply become irrelevant when money and oil is involved or is it just 
somewhat farcical in general?96 
 
Third, there are many examples in everyday society of Muslims and Judeo-Christians 
cohabitating in peace. Jordan is 5 percent Christian and there are no major problems between 
religions there. Lebanon in the past could have been used as an example to support Huntington’s 
theory but the current status of Lebanon would oppose his theory. Lebanon has not had 
significant strife between Muslims and Christians in decades, and is at the moment, arguably one 
of the more stable places in the region.  This stability exists despite the fact that Lebanon is 
almost half Christian and half Muslim, depending on which statistics are looked at.97 However, 
there has been persecution against Christians in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan. 
 
 Islam and the West: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Theory: This report ultimately found that 
Samuel Huntington’s theory was wrong based on three of four false indicators used in trying to 
determine the compatibility on political values between Western and Islamic societies.98 
However, it partially concurs with him.  Therefore, it would probably align with the belief that 
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Western cultural diffusion slightly contributes to anti-Americanism. The thesis statement of this 
study wouldn’t necessarily disagree with this, because it doesn’t claim Western cultural diffusion 
plays no role in Anti-Americanism at all; it only claims that it does not play a primary role.  
 However, Islam and the West does come to a conclusion that agrees with the thesis statement in 
claiming that Samuel Huntington’s theory was simplistic. It is simplistic because it does not take 
into strong consideration any studies on foreign policy, international relations, or terrorism. In 
fairness, the study of terrorism was most likely to have been highly insufficient when Huntington 
published Clash of Civilizations in 1996. 
 
Norris and Pippa reference data from Freedom House revealing that of forty-seven 
Islamic majority countries, a quarter are democracies. One of Huntington’s central tenets is the 
cultural effect on political ideals. This statistic evidences data against that notion. 
 
 Orientalism: It is frankly axiomatic that a large swath of academic works from Arabian Nights 
to modern day mainstream media analyses of the Middle East has had a negative stereotypical 
impact upon the way the region is viewed and treated.  The recent Mosque attacks in New 
Zealand places emphasis on the sort of Islamophobia that runs rampant throughout many parts of 
the world.  According to a New York Post article, it was specifically the work of right-wing 
political commentator Candace Owens who the New Zealand shooter claims to have been greatly 
influenced by.99 Edward Said would certainly link this attack to Orientalism. While Candace 
Owens is certainly no expert on the Middle East, within the vacuum of her critiques on the 
Middle East, that so happened to influence an Islamophobic mass shooting, she was acting as an 
Orientalist by Said’s standards. This is a straightforward example of how Said ‘s concern was 
manifested. 
As previously stated, Said agrees that Western cultural diffusion plays a significant role 
in anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism. So, technically speaking, his theory somewhat 
opposes this thesis statement. However, it does not oppose the thesis statement in totality 
because Orientalism is a byproduct of imperialism.  Therefore, it is imperialism that would be 
the primary catalyst, not organic western cultural diffusion on its own. 
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 Full Text: bin Laden’s Letter to America: The results from assessing bin Laden’s letter align 
with the thesis statement of this study. When it came to the issues that he began to list in a 
particular numbered and lettered order, cultural issues did play a role in his thinking, but they 
were clearly not the primary issue that he was concerned with. He was foremost concerned with 
foreign policy. This is not only shown in the rhetorical emphasis placed on the discussion of 
foreign policy in comparison to cultural issues, but after the religious preface, he listed the issues 
in what seemed like an order of importance, and the initial topics were foreign policy related.  
 
Without having a more transparent view into the mind of bin Laden when he was writing 
this letter, there is no way to totally understand the significance of his religious preface. The first 
question he lists is self responded to by nothing but foreign policy related answers. The second 
question he lists is self-responded to by mostly culturally related answers. It is atypical to think 
he would list the lesser important question as the first question and the more important question 
as the second question. So, most evidence concurs that cultural issues were not his primary 
motivator in committing anti-American violence. If it is not conclusive, it is certainly not 
conclusive in the other direction either. 
 
 Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: This source was totally about 
foreign policy issues, and most of the foreign policy concerns were ultimately connected to 
Israel. These results strongly support the thesis statement of this study. Notably, the results go 
even further in that they not only conclude that Western cultural diffusion is not a primary 
motivator for Hezbollah, but they don’t even seem to be considered at all, according to this book.  
 
 Why is it that while according to the sources analyzed, bin Laden seemed somewhat concerned 
with Western cultural diffusion, but Nasrallah did not? It could be due to their distinctly different 
subscribed forms of Islam. Nasrallah and Hezbollah are an Iranian backed Shia organization. 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda are a Saudi backed Wahhabi Sunni organization.100 It could be 
due to the upbringing of each leader. Lebanon is a significantly more secular place to grow up in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Both these groups have been linked to more countries than the two mentioned, but these are the two countries that are most 
relevant in recent history and the present. Notoriously, Pakistan, the United States, and Britain have all been exposed as having 
either supported Al-Qaeda in its evolutionary incipient stages, or even as it more thoroughly evolved towards the group it is today. 





than Saudi Arabia. It could be due to the fact that Nasrallah knows part of his political base 
includes many Christians, and so he therefore limits most anti-Western or anti-Christian cultural 
rhetoric. It could be due to the fact that Hezbollah, in contrast to many other state classified 
terrorist groups, have a chance of power in the government, and thus want to not burn bridges 
with potential western trade, military, or aid partners. It could also simply be that generally, 
throughout the Middle East, the main motivator of anti-Americanism is not western cultural 
diffusion, but overwhelmingly foreign policy. 
 
 Media, Culture, and Society in Iran: Living with globalization and the Islamic State: This study 
had some conflicting discoveries. On the one hand, there was evidence for a lack of hostility 
towards Western cultural diffusion, which would suggest less of a chance that this is the primary 
issue contributing towards anti-Americanism. This was represented in the allowance of Western 
academic fields, as well as the majority of women who graduate from the universities teaching 
those classes. There is also a love for Western culture such as the love for rock music.  
 
On the other hand, many Internet sites with American content have been banned. Western 
satellite television channels have been banned. And despite Women attending university at 
higher rates than men, there is still a large overtone of anti-feminist patriarchal ideology that 
defines the society. The enforced wearing of the hijab is largely representative of the patriarchal 
issues occurring not only in Iran, but also in many places throughout the Middle East. Recently, 
in Iran, some women have begun to protest against the enforced wearing of the hijab by simply 
taking it off in public places. A woman recently climbed atop an electrical box and took her hijab 
off. Her life was destroyed and she was sentenced to three years in prison.101 An article by 
foreign policy entitled The Flame of Feminism is Alive in Iran noted an instance where dozens of 
women were arrested for a similar showing of defiance.102  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  











Some of this evidence is clearly in support of the thesis and some is against it. However, 
some is difficult to discern. The results can have different meanings depending on the level of 
importance applied to each entity relevant to the action. Is it more significant that the 
government banned Western websites, satellite TV channels, and rock music or is it more 
significant that they were possibly a big enough problem that they needed to be banned? Should 
the level of anti-Americanism be determined by the opinions and actions of the people, the 
government or a combination of both? This is an interesting question that can be assessed with 
additional research. 
 
 Arab Public Opinion on American Policies, Values and People-Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives: Zogby’s assessment of the overall results is a really cogent factor. There were 
also some disagreeable and conflicting moments during the hearing.  One that really stood out 
was when Rep. Ackerman stated that the divide between Arabs and Americans is “a betrayal that 
will not be undone by a United States withdraw from Iraq or a resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This is betrayal that will not be soothed by political settlement in 
Lebanon.”103 Actually, I’d propose that if each of these three hypothetical initiatives happened it 
would drastically improve support for American policy and other attitudes that were the focus of 
the polling. Both Osama bin Laden and Hassan Nasrallah focused on some of these issues in the 
sources reviewed in this report. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the very first situation 
referenced by bin Laden in his letter to America. Nasrallah was heavily concerned with it as 
well. That is not to say it would alleviate the entire problem, but to belittle such a scenario is 
totally in conflict with Ackerman’s own statements as well as testimony that was submitted 
throughout the remainder of the hearing. 
 
To receive government acknowledgement that anti-Americanism is not caused mainly by 
Western cultural diffusion is crucial for this thesis. The United States government is the entity 
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most directly involved with foreign policy. Although, when it comes to culture, an interesting 
question is begged. Is the government most responsible for Western cultural diffusion or does it 
come more so from the private sector? That is something that can possibly be researched further. 
Regardless, the government is involved in at least one component of this thesis statement. This 
hearing didn’t seem to have much of an impact on real world foreign policy. Testimonies get 
swept under the rug, governments change, and Administrations lean in expected ways, so it is 
unsurprising this has no critical bearing on current reality. However, in terms of support for this 
thesis statement, it is a strong source. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
There were seven different sources analyzed in this Thesis. Two sources were directly 
from non-state violent actors, one source was from a Western state government, and four sources 
were academic. The underlying data analyzed by these sources also included other forms of 
evidence such as the polling discussed in the Congressional hearing. All but Samuel 
Huntington’s ideologically based book treats anti-Americanism as more heavily linked to foreign 
policy than Western cultural diffusion.  
 
It is uncomfortable to have to take into consideration what figures such as Osama bin 
Laden and Hassan Nasrallah have to say, but terrorism is one of -if not the main reason- why the 
topic explored in this report is so pressing. It behooves us to hear and assess the grievances of 
non-state violent actors to try to understand what can be done to prevent more violence from 
happening in the future, as well as what can be done to structure a more cohesive world. We 
must not only consider the opinions of Western governments and academics, but also those 
whom seem to most significantly represent this dichotomy between the West and the Muslim 
world. There is no one better to voice the divide and disagreement than the non-state violent 
actors that are assessed in parts of this thesis. Analyzing the ideas of these actors help to support 
the argument that Western cultural diffusion is not the primary motivator in anti-Americanism or 







It should be comforting that evidence shows foreign policy to be more of a factor than 
Western cultural diffusion in anti-Americanism because it is arguably easier to do something 
about. The government has significantly more control over foreign policy than it does cultural 
diffusion. It is apparent what can be done, but if it will get done is of course a totally different 
story, and unlikely. It is unlikely because  the US government tends to prioritize military related 
goals in the Middle East over how the actions related to those goals will impact Muslim public 
opinion.  
 
There are many factors that contribute to anti-American antagonism. The withdrawal 
from the Iran nuclear agreement, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), is another situation that adds to anti-American hostility. It was also a decision that was 
made without much consideration for how it would impact the other parties directly or indirectly 
involved with the agreement. Thesis III will take a look at how withdrawing from JCPOA might 
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 This chapter will shift attention from America’s unfavorable standing in the Arab world to 
President Trump decision to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Agreement and the impact this had 
on world opinion of America’s standing. 
On May 8th 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced to the world that the United States was 
withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or what is more 
colloquially known as the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The deal, which was signed between the 
P5+1 nations and Iran, achieved a removal of sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran limiting its 
nuclear ambitions and allowing verification by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) into their facilities.  
 This foreign policy move by Trump to pull out of the deal reversed one of President Barack 
Obama’s most important achievements and sent shockwaves through the international 
community. A report from Arms Control Association reveals evidence that the international 
community strongly supports the deal. There are documented statements of support from Africa, 





Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.104 However, the 
Trump administration did not see things the same way as did the Obama administration or the 
international community. In a White House press statement, President Trump claimed:  
In theory, the so-called “Iran deal” was supposed to protect the United States and our 
allies from the lunacy of an Iranian nuclear bomb, a weapon that will only endanger the 
survival of the Iranian regime.  In fact, the deal allowed Iran to continue enriching 
uranium and, over time, reach the brink of a nuclear breakout. The deal lifted crippling 
economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for very weak limits on the regime’s nuclear 
activity, and no limits at all on its other malign behavior, including its sinister activities 
in Syria, Yemen, and other places all around the world. In other words, at the point when 
the United States had maximum leverage, this disastrous deal gave this regime — and it’s 
a regime of great terror — many billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash — a great 
embarrassment to me as a citizen and to all citizens of the United States.105 
 After the United States withdrew from the deal, Iran as well as many other countries refused to 
follow suit, and stood strong with the deal in defiance of the United States’ withdrawal. 
However, the United States withdrawal from the deal came with impact. The implications were 
that within a few months of withdrawing from the deal, the United States decided to re-impose 
economic sanctions on Iran. The United States initiated sanctions that targeted Iranian oil, 
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banking and transportation sectors.106 The imposition of sanctions continued in 2019 against 
Iranian space agencies, shipping networks, and against the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad 
Javad Zarif. It was inevitable that Iran would respond to an American breach of the agreement. 
Iran did so by breaching the agreement itself, as it intentionally surpassed the 300 kilogram limit 
for the amount of low-enriched uranium that it could have. This regression led to such a 
breakdown between parties that the BBC published an article entitled “Iran’s nuclear deal is on 
life support. Can it be saved?”107   
 The United States has such power and leverage over the world economy that even if all the 
other 5 of the P5+1 countries abide by the deal, there is still a lot that the United States can do to 
sabotage the deal—and that sabotage seems to be currently at work. JCPOA and its possible 
demise means something different for many relevant countries. This report will explore some of 
the varying perspectives these different countries have about American withdrawal from JCPOA. 
 It can be surmised from the Arms Control Association data listed above, concerning the 
countries that support JCPOA, that there are many supportive nations, but each country interprets 
the situation through its own unique foreign policy lens. It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to 
explore the implications that American withdrawal from JCPOA has for all the countries that 
support it. However, this report will assess the distinct meanings for those countries that are tied 
most closely to the situation.  While Thesis I and II focus on Muslim public opinion, this Thesis 
will focus on the impact the JCPOA withdrawal has on three different sets of countries: the 
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European countries, the Middle Eastern countries, and Russia and China. It sets out to prove that 
the United States’ withdrawal from JCPOA is less significant for the United States than it is for 
other countries connected to the deal. 
3.2. Literature Review 
 A variety of positions on JCPOA exist within the literature. The European countries are most 
supportive of the deal. They have less tension with Iran than do the United States and they 
support the institutions that will facilitate the deal. China and Russia don’t have any unique 
tension with Iran, but they are not as supportive of the institution that facilitates the deal. All 
these countries have different relationships with one another and examining the literature helps 
to narrow down why these stances might be taken.  
 Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes108: This book is 
the most comprehensive and extensive piece of scholarly literature available on the Iran nuclear 
deal. The book’s introduction discusses how Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the deal in 
May 2018. The withdrawal was an election campaign promise that Trump had put forth back in 
2016. It is stated in the book that “It took Trump 18 months to fulfill this election promise: in 
part because Iran was honoring its commitments but also because his key advisers recognized 
that withdrawing from the deal would serve no strategic purpose.”  
 The introduction of the book also explores why there is such hostility between Iran and the 
United States and explores the causes of animosity on both sides of the conflict. Among the 
reasons discussed on why America is hostile towards Iran are the takeover of the U.S. Embassy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





and the taking of fifty-two American diplomats hostage back in 1979 and Iranian perpetration of 
terrorist attacks both directly and indirectly. Specifically, Hezbollah carried out a suicide bomb 
attack against the U.S. Embassy back in 1983 and it is claimed that Iran was complicit in the 
1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Iranian forces are said to harass 
U.S. ships on the Persian Gulf, detain U.S. citizens on dubious charges, trained forces in Iraq that 
targeted U.S. military, supplied Hezbollah with rockets that target Israel and backed the Assad 
regime in Syria.109 
 The book also lays out the quarrels that Iran has with the United States. Iran resents CIA 
involvement in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, U.S. involvement or 
acquiescence-depending on your perspective- in Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran 
during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, the downing of a private airliner by a guided missile cruiser in 
1988, naval actions, and a raid on an Iranian Liaison office.110 
The early background of JCPOA is also discussed. Back in 2013, Iran almost achieved the 
capability to build a nuclear weapon.  
“Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium was growing at an average rate of 150 
kilograms per month, and it had almost enough 20%-enriched uranium hexafluoride for 
a weapon if further enriched. The underground enrichment facility at Fordow was being 
readied to produce more 20% product. Meanwhile, the Arak research reactor was 
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nearing completion, and would soon be able to produce enough weapons grade 
plutonium for one or two bombs per year.”111  
There was more pressure gathering against Iran by this point, but there had been attempts to deal 
with their nuclear aspirations long before JCPOA was negotiated. Many of these attempts were 
from countries other than the United States.  
 Understanding the history behind this deal and the events that led up to it is important and the 
book does a thorough job of providing historical context. It not only discusses the historical 
tensions between the United States and Iran, it looks at some of the historical background of the 
other countries involved in the deal as well. France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
negotiated with Iran from 2003-2005 and the United Nations placed sanctions on them from 
2005-2010. This was a latent issue that had been boiling under the surface for over ten years.  
 The book meticulously explores the details of JCPOA. It highlights what was at stake for the 
parties involved. The P5+1 was most motivated to limit Iran’s nuclear program to the most 
stringent level possible. Iran desired getting sanctions removed while not giving away too many 
concessions on their nuclear program. As averred in the book, “the JCPOA established the most 
intrusive monitoring regime applied by the IAEA anywhere in the world.”112 It goes on to show 
that Iran had been instructed to destroy its aforementioned 20%-enriched uranium as well as 98% 
of its low-enriched uranium (LEU); Iran had to limit LEU stockpiles to 300 kilograms for 15 
years; remove 14,000 of 20,000 centrifuges at the Natanz plant; limit the levels of enriched 
uranium for 15 years; allow the IAEA to inspect its nuclear sites, and to not obtain heavy water. 
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In return, Iran received sanctions relief. This relief also meant that Iran would get roughly 100 
billion dollars in oil profits frozen in accounts that they did not have access to. 
 The book also explores the involvement and implications concerning other countries around the 
world. For example, the book shows that in April of 2018 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu revealed thousands of pages of Iranian documents taken by Israeli intelligence 
regarding its past nuclear programs. This proved that Iran did intend to build a nuclear weapon. 
However, throughout these documents there was no evidence proving that Iran was currently 
continuing any of its nuclear programs.113 Israel is in a different position from most other 
countries signed onto JCPOA. They perceive themselves and are considered by many analysts to 
be in a constant existential crisis. Israel has threatened that they would possibly attack Iran in 
order to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The book notes a precedent for this type of 
action: Israel conducted airstrikes against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981 and Syria’s reactor in al-
Kibar in 2007.114  
 There were three other countries in the Middle East that supported Trump’s withdrawal from 
JCPOA. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all were opposed to JCPOA. The 
contextual relations between these three countries exist in a Sunni-Shia conflict. Similarly to 
Israel, Saudi Arabia feels very threatened by Iran and it is alleged that it could possibly attempt 
to facilitate its own nuclear weapons program in order to deter Iran. 
 The basic positions of other countries are examined as well in the section on U.S. withdrawal. 
After the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the deal, multiple European politicians 
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visited him to try and convince him to do otherwise. French President Emmanuel Macron, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Boris Johnson-- who was United Kingdom Foreign 
Secretary at the time --all visited Washington DC. 115 That’s not to say those are the only 
countries and political representatives who opposed withdrawal from the deal, it is just who 
personally visited Washington DC.  There is a lot more detail that cannot be thoroughly listed 
here, but the book’s information is extensive. 
 Uncertain Future also discusses some of the positions and actions of other important countries 
such as China and Russia. For example, both countries are suspicious of the IAEA. They don’t 
want to allow the IAEA to have unfettered access to search Iranian facilities. Also, the book 
explains the significance of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2231 and 
2216. It looks at how the European Union did its best to save the deal after the Trump 
administration withdrew; how the United states was considering regime change, and a panoply of 
other issues.  
 Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit (Congressional Research Service) (“U.S. Exit”): This 
report from the Congressional Research Service is not quite as extensive as Uncertain Future, 
but it gets down to the most important points in a concise manner. The summary of this report 
states that the Trump administration believes JCPOA is insufficient because the sanctions relief 
will allow Iran to pursue dubious activities that the United States disagrees with. The summary 
also notes that the JCPOA will not prevent Iran from developing ballistic missiles.116 In 
Uncertain Future, the authors stipulate that critics of the deal, including Trump, had a problem 
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with the Sunset provisions.  The Congressional Research Service introductory summary goes on 
to explain that Russia, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all opposed the United 
States withdrawal from the deal. 
 In the introduction, it is noted that the P5+1 were negotiating with Iran around 2006. Also 
noted, was that the UN passed Resolution 1929, its most comprehensive resolution up to that 
point back in 2010. However, the road to JCPOA began with the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) back 
in 2013, after the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. This document informs that the 
JPA essentially put Iran’s nuclear program on hold, which allowed time for JCPOA to be formed 
and signed. It goes on to note that “[W]hen the JPA went into effect in January 2014, Iran had 
enough uranium hexafluoride containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, 
would have yielded enough weapons-grade HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] for as many as 
eight nuclear weapons.”117 The JPA included centrifuge limits, level of enrichment limits, LEU 
stockpile limits, the right to continue enrichment research and development activities, but not to 
accumulate enriched uranium. It also included additional monitoring from the IAEA and a 
pledge from Iran to “refrain from commissioning the [Arak] reactor, transferring fuel or heavy 
water to the reactor site, testing and producing additional reactor fuel, and installing remaining 
reactor components.”118 The deal also included some general promises from Iran such as the 
rather straightforward pledge of not building a nuclear weapon. In return, Iran received access to 
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hard currency and the continuation of trade in Iranian sectors such as the petrochemical industry, 
the precious metal industry, and the auto sector.119 
 The U.S. Exit report also goes through a bullet point list of the provisions accomplished for the 
JCPOA deal. When the facets of each deal are simply listed one after the other, it is unsurprising 
that the provisions detailed in JCPOA are much more extensive and binding than the provisions 
laid out in the JPA.  Iran’s centrifuge production was limited for ten years to no more than 5,060 
IR-1 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA Iran cannot produce enriched uranium with more than 3.67% 
uranium-235 for fifteen years. In that same time frame Iran can only enrich uranium at the 
Natanz facility and cannot build any new facilities, and must limit their LEU stockpile, as 
discussed in Uncertain Future. For the duration Iran must limit the amount of centrifuges at 
Fordow enrichment facility.  Limitations were placed on Iran’s ability to replace damaged 
centrifuge machines over periods of eight and ten years. Also, Iran’s ability to conduct research 
and development was halted on all technologies except for gas centrifuge enrichment. Other 
provisions were listed, but these were the main ones. 
 Some important facts are noted in a section on U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA and its effects. It 
is stated that the Trump administration initially was ostensibly in support of the deal. It was not 
until 2018 that the Trump administration began to express disapproval. Then Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson expressed concern that while JCPOA might delay Iran achieving a nuclear 
weapon, it would not totally prevent it.120  
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 It is noted that on January 12th, 2018 President Trump declared that the United States would no 
longer waive sanctions unless America’s “European allies” fixed the parts of the deal that were 
perceived by Trump to be flawed.121 Afterwards, President Trump claimed the United States 
would try to work out a new deal; diplomatic meetings were held between the United States and 
European partners, but no deal was agreed upon.  
 It is ultimately explained that the Trump administration officially withdrew from the deal on 
May 12th, 2018 and revealed a list of demands that had to be met in order for the United States to 
agree to a new deal. Other parties involved in the deal heavily criticized the withdrawal. France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement that they would continue to try and 
maintain the deal, specifically mentioning the economic benefit for Iran. Additionally, a 
representative from the European Union (EU) made it clear that the EU would abide by the deal 
if Iran did as well.122 But importantly, it was explained that Iran made the decision that they 
would not abide by the deal if the United States did not do so also.  
 Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) On the United States Interest and 
the Military Balance in the Middle East (Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session) 123: This hearing 
provides crucial perspectives regarding the implications of JCPOA. Now deceased Senator John 
McCain, in the hearing’s opening statement, expressed concern that Iran’s access to new funding 
will inevitably give it the funding necessary to purchase military hardware from Russia or China- 
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who are eager to sell to Iran.124 Senator Jack Reed spoke next and expressed concern over Israel. 
He noted that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would never support the deal but that 
the United States must “deepen further our cooperation on military and intelligence matters with 
Israel and to better understand the concerns of the Israelis.”125 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 
also made clear that Israel would be heavily supported. Specifically, he said “Iran still directs 
hostility and violence towards our closest ally in the region, Israel” and that  “The United States 
will maintain its ironclad commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge, or QME. We will 
keep providing Israel with advanced capabilities.”126 Later on in the hearing, General Dempsey 
presented an article from the Israeli newspaper HAARETZ critiquing JCPOA as he claimed that 
Israelis across the political spectrum were opposed to the deal and so was Saudi Arabia.127 
 Throughout the hearing a lot of queries were made regarding how Iran impacts United States 
national security strategy. There was also further emphasis on Israel and Saudi Arabia’s 
opposition to the deal. There is additional discussion of Russia’s willingness to sell weapons to 
Iran. There is also a worrying concern that some European partners-particularly the UK, France, 
and Germany --would not go along with the United States withdrawing from the deal. Important 
to this Thesis, is Ambassador Burns’ statement concerning unifying positions with the 
Europeans: 
“We’ll have to have the Europeans with us. In a strange sort of way, President Putin has 
stayed with President Obama on this particular issue, despite our sanctions on Russia 
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over Ukraine. The Russians don’t want Iran to become a nuclear-weapons power. I’m 
not predicting they’re going to be a great partner, but you have to work on the Russians 
as well.” 128  
Russia is highly relevant to this deal because they are aligned with Iran on issues such as support 
for the Assad regime in Syria.  
 The implications for the Middle East are much more profound. For example, at one point in the 
hearing, Senator Cotton and Ambassador Burns both strongly agreed that a nuclear proliferated 
Middle East undoubtedly would lead to nuclear war. Professor Walter Russell Mead was 
interviewed in the hearing as well.  Professor Mead noted that some people believe American 
foreign policy involvement in the Middle East will decrease due to the recent shale gas 
revolution in the United States, but he believes that is a false assessment because while Middle 
Eastern oil might not be important to the United States anymore, it is still important to American 
allies. Also according to Mead, if the United States were to relinquish this involvement, then 
another country would most likely take their place.129 
 Belfer Center Experts on U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: This source includes a 
large collection of brief statements on JCPOA from experts in the field. Of the fourteen 
statements included in the source, only one expert was in support of President Trump’s decision 
to withdraw from the deal. From the point of view of the large majority of the scholars, the 
United States withdrawal has created a host of problems.  
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 The world is now more likely to side with Iran on JCPOA because of the troublesome behavior 
from the United States. Professor Graham Allison cites a statement from a top general in the 
Israeli Defense Forces who supports the deal, even if he believes it has some flaws. 130Professor 
Burns, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, also believes the deal has some flaws, but is overall 
sufficient. Burns adds Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA to a list of other diplomatic exits, such 
as the exit from the Paris Climate Change Accord. He believes this withdrawal can isolate the 
United States from European allies. In addition to Professor Graham Allison’s reference of an 
Israeli general, a former Israeli National Security Advisor, Chuck Frelich called the withdrawal 
from the deal “a historic error”.131 Others called it “a reckless strategic mistake of immense 
consequence”132 and “the most consequential foreign policy blunder yet from an administration 
that appears determined to undermine U.S. influence around the world”.133 Throughout the 
Belfer report, the most reoccurring theme is that the United States has put itself into conflict with 
its European allies and it has damaged its credibility and standing around the world. The one 
statement in support of the Trump administration’s decision came from Nawaf Obaid, a visiting 
fellow of Belfer, in the intelligence and defense section department. He was equally critical of 
the Obama administration in signing the deal as the other scholars were of the Trump 
administration for withdrawing.134 His concern is with the expiration dates on the deal and taking 
advantage of using sanctions to pressure Iran further.  















 There is not yet an expansive amount of information available on the specific impact the 
JCPOA withdrawal will have on various countries. The strongest sources available were 
analyzed in order to gather the opinion of scholars, government spokespersons, authors, 
diplomats and others. The relevant data is put into a historical context and current events 
chronology in order to more meticulously understand the overall point of view of the respective 
countries. In order to achieve this perspective, a large variety of secondary sources were 
separately assessed as well.  
3.4. Results 
 Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes: In this source, a 
sufficient history of recent U.S.-Iranian relations is explored. There is also a thorough 
explanation of JCPOA itself. Crucially for this Thesis, it is noted that the UK, Germany, and 
France had been negotiating with Iran for some time. This further explains their adamant support 
for the deal.  These are all the countries whose top leaders visited Trump when he decided to 
withdraw from JCPOA. Israel is given a particular amount of attention due to its ongoing conflict 
with Iran. Israel is said to be staunchly opposed to JCPOA, as are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the 
United Arab Emirates. These countries have bitter feuds with Iran, and they have formed a 
partnership in response.135 For Israel and Saudi Arabia to form any type of partnership 
whatsoever speaks to how much they both fear Iran becoming a nuclear power. The emphasis on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







the concern from these four Middle Eastern countries is an important result to analyze because it 
reveals support for JCPOA withdrawal, in opposition to most of the region. We also learn that 
while China and Russia are both ostensibly in support of JCPOA, they seem to be more 
supportive of Iran than are the other parties involved in the deal. Russia and China are the two 
countries known to be most directly challenging the U.S. led liberal world order, so their 
willingness to support Iran is expected. Russia’s position is not surprising in light of its self-
interested position in alignment with Iran in supporting Syria’s Assad regime. 
 Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit (Congressional Research Service): Learning further 
details of the transition from JPA to JCPOA helps to better illuminate the intent on both sides of 
the negotiation. There was a build up to JCPOA over many years. JPA was an accomplishment 
but JCPOA was an even bigger accomplishment. In what follows, further emphasis is placed on 
the remaining parties’ opposition to U.S. withdrawal from the deal.  
 It is revealed the Trump administration initially supported JCPOA, but then changed positions 
in 2018. It might be worth looking at why that was the case, because the 2016 Trump campaign 
was notably opposed to the deal.136 Nonetheless, European allies and the P5+1 were not pleased 
with the final result. The EU, U.K., France and Germany’s persistence to maintain the deal 
despite U.S. withdrawal proves the importance of the deal to those countries. Trump said he 
would try to work something out but nothing ever came to fruition. He insisted that the European 
allies needed to fix the deal --a move that put further strains on the Trump administration’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







diplomacy. It is a double negative to withdraw from a deal that was so difficult to accomplish 
and then demand that your allies fix it in order to satisfy a re-entry.  
  The economic incentives for particular countries rest on a foundation of security issues that are 
a concern for the entire international community. This could help to explain why the Trump 
administration was so willing to withdraw from the deal, but other partners did not follow. If the 
United States was an important trade partner of Iran, then President Trump wouldn’t be as 
willing to pull out of the deal. The following discussion will analyze specific economic 
implications for the countries that are opposed to the United States withdrawal from JCPOA. 
 Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) On the United States Interest and 
the Military Balance in the Middle East (Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session): Russia and China are 
arguably the two most important countries from an American perspective. Russia and China’s 
desire to sell weapons to Iran proves they have additional motives besides security. As a 
consequence, it is in their best interest to help prevent Iran from getting sanctioned by the United 
States. In China’s case, they are doubly incentivized because they are the top importer of Iranian 
oil.137138 
 The discussion of the impact on Israel is also revealing. The proceedings confirmed Congress’ 
insistence upon insuring Israeli security and this suggests that Israel’s position towards JCPOA 
was taken into consideration by the United States when the Trump administration decided to 
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withdraw. It is also made known in this hearing that it is allegedly not just the Israeli government 
and Israel’s head of state who opposed the deal, but it encompassed a broad spectrum of the 
Israeli people. There are outliers revealed in the research that will be discussed next, but Israel is 
reportedly near unified in opposition to JCPOA.  
 Russia’s disapproval of Iran becoming a nuclear power is something also taken into 
consideration during the hearing. Russia is in a particularly unique situation in their relationship 
with Iran. They are probably closer to Iran than any of the other P5+1 countries. Despite being 
close with Iran, Russia is ostensibly in favor of JCPOA. However, some secondary sources that 
will be assessed in the discussion show Russia may have other additional motives including a 
potential weapons deal with Iran. 
 The comments from Professor Walter Russell Mead are incredibly insightful. He points out that 
the United States will keep a military presence in the Middle East notwithstanding the shale gas 
revolution in the U.S. That is because the U.S. will seek to protect its allies’ access to oil, which 
underscores the economic necessity that some European countries also might have in supporting 
JCPOA.  As noted in an article from The Guardian, Europe gets a lot of their oil from unstable 
countries in the Middle East.139 Iran was not one of the countries mentioned, but it shows that 
Europe is clearly more in need of oil than the United States is. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







 Belfer Center Experts on U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: In this source it is 
surmised that the majority of experts interviewed were opposed to the Trump administrations 
withdrawal from JCPOA. Most of the statements are explicit. 
 There is also evidence that at least some members of the Israeli security establishment were 
opposed to the withdrawal. Both a top Israeli general and a former Israeli National Security 
Advisor staunchly opposed the U.S. withdrawing from the deal. This shows that there is some 
dissent against the Netanyahu administration’s support for the withdrawal. As noted earlier, other 
sources in this Thesis confirmed that Israeli intelligence revealed Iran has pursued nuclear 
weapons in the past, an intelligence effort that was motivated by a desire to stop Iran 
nuclearization.  
 Former U.S. Ambassador Burn’s (an ambassador to NATO) testimony is highly credible when 
it comes to assessing diplomatic implications. He made clear that the withdrawal can damage 
relations with European allies. Specifically, he stated that the withdrawal could potentially 
isolate the United States from its European allies.  This is further strong evidence that leans in 
favor of Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA having a negative impact on American reputation and 
diplomacy. 
3.5. Discussion 
 Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes: The Trump 
administration has made many decisions that have sowed doubt in the minds of leaders around 
the world about the ability of the United States to keep their word. As the results from Uncertain 





are a multitude of factors why these countries were more supportive of the deal than the Trump 
administration. European countries have to deal with figuring out ways to maneuver around the 
sanctions. One of these mechanisms is called the Instex trade vehicle, which is run mainly by 
these three European countries: 
The UK foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, said: “The entity will facilitate legitimate trade 
under European and international law. Its immediate focus will be on enabling trade in 
goods where the immediate need of the Iranian people is greatest, ie foodstuffs, 
pharmaceuticals and consumer goods.”140 
 
 The Instex trade vehicle is not the only means by which European countries are trying to assist 
Iran in sustaining their economy despite U.S. sanctions. France has just recently proposed a 15 
billion dollar bailout for Iran in order to help them deal with the losses from sanctions.141 
However, unsurprisingly, the Trump administration’s strategy is diametrically opposed to any 
sort of bailout for Iran, as the United States is trying to put as much pressure on Iran as possible. 
Europe wants to help Iran buffer this pressure, but it is still unclear if the bailout will ensue since 
there is a risk that European finance and banking companies who may participate in the bailout 
could end up themselves being sanctioned by the United States. 
 Of course, Europe’s assistance of Iran is not strictly due to their good will. As previously 
discussed, European countries are much more dependent on oil imports than are the United 
States. For example, the French oil company Total S.A, signed an oil deal with Iran in 2016 to 
buy hundreds of thousands of barrels of crude oil per day.142 This clearly gives France and the 
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EU extra incentive to allow Iran to sell its oil, and this is not the only deal between Iran and 
European countries. Additionally, the EU is largely dependent on oil imports, particularly from 
Russia. The EU imports 69 percent of all their natural gas and 37 percent of that gas comes from 
Russia.143 It is sensible that Europe would not want to let the market get smaller by withholding 
Iranian oil, especially when the country that dominates the market is one that is often at conflict 
with NATO and European countries. However, European support for JCPOA did not prevent 
them from condemning Iran’s recent alleged coordinated attack with the Houthis against Saudi 
oil facilities.144 This European need for oil could also influence how Russia might manipulate the 
JCPOA. Although Russia ostensibly opposes United States withdrawal from JCPOA, sanctions 
on Iran might lead to Russia exporting more oil to Europe. The fewer potential energy providers 
there are on the market, the greater potential that creates for Russia. 
  
 Russia may have other important motivations.  Russia and China seem to be in a significantly 
different position from other parties signed onto the deal. As noted in the results, Russia and 
China seem to be more supportive of JCPOA than the other parties. As previously mentioned, 
this is partially due to the increasing ideological conflict between Chinese and Russian 
nationalism and a United States led liberal world order. Iran has joined the side of China and 
Russia on more issues than just JCPOA. Not only are Iran and Russia allied with Assad in Syria, 
but now Iranian, Russian, and Chinese military forces have joined in combined exercises. For the 
first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution, they are holding joint naval exercises together in the 
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Northern Indian Ocean and the Oman Sea.145 As Chinese power increases, China’s allies become 
bolder, knowing that American dominance is now starting to be challenged by China.146 This 
new naval alliance is an example of political partnering to undermine U.S. leadership. 
 
  The U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA holds importance for Israel, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and 
Bahrain for reasons other than those espoused by the U.S. The other countries involved in the 
study consider the withdrawal to have a significant impact on their affairs, but from a negative 
standpoint. The Middle Eastern countries seen through the lens of this particular source believe 
the withdrawal from JCPOA will have a positive impact. None of them seem concerned with 
anything other than how JCPOA ostensibly affects their national security. The security concerns 
of the Middle Eastern countries are prioritized more than any other party. The United States 
withdrawal is based on a perceived security strategy as well, but the United States is in a less 
pressured circumstance than are the Middle Eastern countries simply because of geography. The 
Middle Eastern countries are in closer proximity to Iran. They are also engaged in conflicts 
related to Iran that are very close to, or in, their own countries. This is a different dynamic for 
them than that of the United States, because all military conflict with Iran occurs near their 
borders, not in the West.  
 
 The relations between the Gulf-states,147 Iran and Israel are volatile. As noted in the literature 
review, Israel has created a precedent of striking nuclear reactors. They struck reactors in both 
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147 Qatar is an exception because they trade with Iran. This is also why the other Gulf-states as well as other countries imposed a 





Iraq and Syria. Israel and Iran have been threatening each other for years. There are plenty of 
threats between the United States and Iran as well, but it doesn’t feel quite as urgent and visceral 
as the feud between Iran and Israel.  Most Americans don’t fear an invasion. The same cannot be 
said for the citizenry of Israel, Iran, and the Gulf-states.  For Israel, and the Gulf states, the 
JCPOA didn’t go far enough in restricting Iran from building nuclear weapons and other 
armaments.  
 
 Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit (Congressional Research Service):  
In this report, emphasis is placed on the Trump administration’s concern with JCPOA’s narrow 
scope of sanctions, such relief giving Iran the ability to pursue nefarious activity. The Trump 
administration also stresses its concern with Iran’s capability to produce ballistic missiles 
without restriction. Thus there is a pattern of broad based opposition to withdrawal from the deal 
related to security and support for the deal related to strategic or economic advantage.  
 
 The Trump’s administration’s concern over Iran’s ability to produce ballistic missiles is 
unreasonable and not in line with historical precedent. Throughout history, countries usually only 
submit to being permanently disarmed if they have been defeated in war.  
 
 This source discusses the position of the European countries as well. The EU opposes Trump’s 
withdrawal partially because it has an economic incentive. The EU is one of Iran’s top-three 
trade partners.148 Notably, the other two top trade partners are China and the United Arab 
Emirates. The UAE’s opposition to the deal, in the context of being a trade partner with Iran 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







conflicts with my Thesis (which posits that the U.S. opposed the deal because they have less to 
lose) in that UAE opposes the deal when its security is much more threatened.  China and the EU 
are economically incentivized to encourage easier trade with Iran and support JCPOA, but the 
United Arab Emirates is also economically incentivized and it opposes JCPOA. This can most 
certainly be attributed to the exceedingly sour relations between Iran and the United Arab 
Emirates, despite being top trade partners.  
 
 The UAE’s opposition to the JCPOA highlights the complexity of intra-regional conflict in the 
Middle East, and undermines a simplistic single or dominant factor theoretical assessment of the 
US motivation to withdraw that is focused on in this Thesis.  If relations deteriorate to the point 
of war then war will often get in the way of trade, as countries at war would often impose a 
blockade against one another. The UAE obviously has a heightened geographic risk of attack 
from Iran, and it could be expected that the UAE would want the sorts of further limitations on 
Iran military proclivities (e.g., restrictions on anti ballistic missiles) articulated by the Trump 
administration. Notably Saudi and Emirati forces are fighting against Iranian backed Houthi 
forces in Yemen. So, this is somewhat different from being in a real war, but highlights that 
economic incentives and the degree of risk of injury, are independent variables to be assessed in 
judging what factor or factors still slightly disproves part of this Thesis (that the US withdrawal 
is influenced by the remoteness of risk). The UAE’s trading partner status with Iran is not 
enough to outweigh its need for security and its efforts to broaden support among affected 
nations. It shows that economics are not necessarily a core incentive, standing alone, in 






 Impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) On the United States Interest and 
the Military Balance in the Middle East (Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session): The most essential 
piece of information derived from this source was that Russia and China have an interest in 
selling weapons to Iran. China is already a major trade partner with Iran, particularly with oil. 
Russia already has a strategic alliance with Iran in Syria. Also, all three countries are opposed to 
an American led liberal world order. Adding a weapons partnership to this mix forms a tripartite 
alliance. Putting the issue of security aside, this information clarifies that Russia and China have 
the most to lose of all the P5+1 parties involved in the agreement.  
 
 However, there have been reports of Russia possibly being incentivized to support Trump’s 
withdrawal.  An article from Foreign Policy magazine opines that the Russian-Iranian 
partnership is currently tenuous, but Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA could possibly help to 
strengthen the strategic relationship between Iran and Russia.149 
  According to an article from The National Interest: 
 “ [Russian] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was in chain talks with European leaders 
discussing ways to save the deal without the United States. But Moscow was the least 
vocal among the dissatisfied—since no Russian vital interests are at stake and some 
actual benefits emerge. Consider this: after America’s abrupt exit, Iran suddenly looks 
good. Uncertainty over tensions force oil prices to go up. Europe is now more 
distrustful towards Washington and turmoil among NATO allies is inevitable.”150  
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 Thus according to the aforementioned sources, Russia’s position on Trump’s withdrawal 
from the JCPOA is specious. The perspective that Russia is currently friendly with Iran, so it 
would oppose the withdrawal, is based on a normative assessment. The perspective that 
Russia would support the withdrawal is a situation that entails more scrutiny of Russia’s 
strategy. Both perspectives are possible: Russia could be secretly supporting the withdrawal 
for all the aforementioned reasons (trade benefit, political support of its ally) or they could be 
sincerely opposing it, it is not possible to make this conclusion.  
 
 Belfer Center Experts on U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal: There was further 
evidence of the withdrawal being bad for diplomacy with European allies. However, the more 
poignant piece of information was the two different accounts of Israeli security officials who 
opposed Trump’s withdrawal.  
 
 Israel has probably been most vocal country in their opposition to JCPOA, and therefore their 
support for America’s withdrawal as well makes sense. Learning in this source that there are 
high-ranking voices of dissent begs the question of how exactly to determine a country’s position 
on JCPOA. Is it based on government’s view only, and if so then which parts of government? Is 
it based on citizenry?  Here, it is important to learn of the voices of dissent against Israel’s 
position on JCPOA but for sake of simplicity it is best to mostly consider the government’s 







 Each of the countries are different in terms of their positioning and orientation toward JCPOA 
America’s withdrawal assessed in this Thesis. The Middle East countries that are opposed to the 
deal as well as the United States are mostly concerned with security related issues. However, the 
security implications for the Middle Eastern countries are objectively more existential than they 
are for the United States. The European countries are concerned with security as well, but they 
are also motivated by an intention to see to it that limitations imposed on Iran do not damage it. 
There was some evidence provided that the European countries could possibly have economic 
incentives as well. They undoubtedly have more of an economic incentive than does the United 
States. The United States has had sanctions on Iran since Clinton signed an executive order 
imposing them in 1995.151  
 
 Then there are those countries, in terms of their relationship to Iran, that challenge US for 
world leadership. Russia and China also have incentives to support JCPOA; both countries have 
intentions of selling weapons to Iran, and China is the top importer of Iranian oil. There is a 
possibility Russia is secretly and strategically supportive of the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA. 
However, with an alliance with Iran in Syria, JCPOA is more important for Russia than the 
United States.  
 
 The ramifications of JCPOA are important for everyone connected to the deal and potentially 
for the entire world. There is a significant amount of importance for the United States, but it 
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mostly is based on security issues. All the other countries have security concerns as well as other 
concerns, or their security concern was objectively higher than that of the United States.  
 
 The United States withdrawal has affected the U.S. to a lesser extent than other countries: it has 
affected the dynamics of United States military interactions with Iran and by damaging 
American diplomatic credibility in general and with JCPOA partners in particular. It does not 
directly affect the United States economy and the American homeland is not in immediate 
danger. This is not the case for the rest of the countries analyzed in this report. Russia is the 
country that comes closest to the United States in terms of JCPOA holding little significance to 
its agenda, but its partnership with Iran in Syria and its desire to sell weapons to Iran is enough to 
show that there is more that Russia is concerned with than just the potential of an Iranian nuclear 
state. 
 
 Overall, the evidence reviewed here conclusively shows that of all the countries analyzed in 
this report, the deal was least important for the United States. The United States is primarily 
concerned with the potential of an Iranian nuclear state. This is why it was so easy for Trump to 
withdraw from the deal.  
 
 This research did lead to a potential for other topics. Something that would be interesting to 
look at would be how Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA affected other countries that were not 
analyzed in this report. The countries analyzed in this report were arguably the most relevant, but 








3.7. Thesis Portfolio Conclusion 
3.7.1. Chapter I 
 In Thesis I, the impact that American military policy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria has on 
Muslim public opinion was explored.  A general conclusion on all the countries combined was 
given: these military activities have a negative impact on Muslim public opinion. However, the 
assessment of each country had slightly different results. 
 
 Negative, positive, and indifferent results were categorized. Of the data that was assessed, a 
majority was negative.  In Afghanistan, a significant percentage of people were recorded to have 
preferred economic assistance as opposed to military assistance. Whether Afghans supported the 
war effort or not, 35 percent rated the progress of reconstruction as fair and 32 percent rated it as 
poor. It should be noted that it is perhaps incomplete to assess data pertaining to reconstruction 
of a war that has not yet fully ended, but the data is still reliable. 
 
 Another perspective that was considered in order to help indirectly determine how negative 
Muslim public opinion about American military policy is viewed was to consider support for Al-
Qaeda in some different countries throughout the Middle East. Support for Al-Qaeda is not 
strong relative to assessing other normal types of data, but when considering the popularity of a 
violent extremist group, lower numbers held a stronger bearing than they usually would and were 
still deemed to be negative. Support for Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin-Laden was between fourteen 
to 27 percent, except for higher numbers in Egypt and Palestine whom 44 percent and 56 percent 






 In assessing the Syria-related data it was discovered that a significant percentage of Muslims 
throughout the Middle East oppose U.S. coalition bombing of ISIS. To confirm that this 
disapproval was not mostly made up of extremists or extremist supporters who happened to be 
polled, general support for ISIS was lower than was opposition to U.S. coalition bombing. 
Within this same data, 73 percent found American foreign policy to be either negative or 
somewhat negative. Other ISIS related data was looked at as well; a majority of those polled who 
supported ISIS did so for a military or political reason. A very small percentage claimed 
religious motivation as their reason for supporting ISIS. 
 
 Additionally, when Muslim respondents were polled about a host of issues from opinion on 
American drone usage and President Trump’s foreign policy to the chance for peace democracy 
in Iraq, the responses were largely negative. There was some positive and indifferent data, but 
not as much as the negative. Therefore, the conclusion did support the hypothesis. 
 
 These findings showed that while many factors can influence a negative impact on Muslim 
public opinion, American military policy was the strongest factor. Muslim public opinion 
evidences that American led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are highly unpopular. American drone 
activity was not assessed from a standpoint of drone activity in each respective country, but in 
total usage it tended to be largely opposed by Muslim countries. This means that not only are 
more formal wars that include ground troops and traditional weaponry opposed by Muslim 






 Hypothetically, there is a lot that can be done with information such as this. It can be used to 
directly influence government policy. However, the government has most likely already 
reviewed this data. There is only one other way in which this data can be used: it can be added to 
the collection of similar data and used to help inform the general population. It can be made 
available to high school students as well as university students. It can be made available to local 
libraries; or, it can be made available to an online network of sorts which regular people have 
access to. The reason for doing this would be to attempt to use information to help allow for a 
better-informed public regarding foreign policy decisions in the Middle East.  Realistically, it 
doesn’t seem feasible that this would really happen or achieve the intended result. The data 
would need to have a sense of unique credibility-which it does not have-in order to trigger the 
motivation necessary for such a distribution effort. Additionally, even if the information did 





3.7.2. Chapter II 
 Thesis II explored the causation of anti-American rhetoric in the Middle East. Specifically, it 
compared the spread of American culture-which was labeled “Western cultural diffusion”- to 
American foreign policy. In order to determine which had a stronger influence on anti-






 The piece of literature most directly supportive of Western cultural diffusion as the main 
catalyst for anti-Americanism was Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. He references 
wars that seem to be divided between cultural lines and religious conflicts in order to prove his 
theory. He also points to ideological divides as well.  
 
 In an academic study that directly assessed Clash of Civilizations titled Islam and the West: 
Testing the Clash of Civilizations Theory, the researchers discover results that are mixed. The 
researchers determined in this report that a cultural clash does exist, but it is not the main 
causation of conflict between the East and West. The researchers considered that to be a 
simplistic way of viewing the situation. 
 
 In Edward Said’s Orientalism, there is a strong overlap between western cultural diffusion and 
western foreign policy. He emphatically acknowledges western cultural diffusion, but considers 
it a product of imperialism and colonialism. Since the cultural diffusion is a byproduct of 
imperialism and colonialism and can be more related to foreign policy, Orientalism was 
determined to be overall supportive of the thesis statement. 
 
 One of the most telling sources analyzed was Osama Bin Laden’s Letter to America. The letter 
included accusations lodged against both American culture as well as American and Western 
foreign policy. However, it was determined that Osama bin Laden placed an emphasis on his 






 Another notorious antagonist of America, Hassan Nasrallah-the leader of Hezbollah, was also 
assessed. The book Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is an entire 
book dedicated to the notorious leader’s writings, speeches, and interviews. In it, he continually 
expresses contempt for Western foreign policy-particularly Israel and America, but he does not 
once speak of an opposition to western culture. So, it was straightforward that foreign policy is 
the leading contributor towards anti-Americanism within Hezbollah.  
 
 Media, Culture, and Society in Iran: Living with globalization and the Islamic State explored 
different aspects of society within Iran. The source itself did not discuss foreign policy much, but 
in assessing Iran’s response to Western and American culture, the results were mixed. The 
assessment did not seem to clearly support the thesis or opposition to it. 
 
 Last, in a congressional hearing in which multiple politicians and academic experts spoke, 
more evidence was found to be supportive of the thesis than oppositional to the thesis. At one 
point in the hearing, it is even noted that American culture is highly appreciated in the Middle 
East in addition to American foreign policy being the main driver behind anti-Americanism. 
 
 A few conclusions can be drawn from the results of Thesis II. There is a distinction between 
what was labeled within the report as organic Western cultural diffusion and Western cultural 
diffusion that is a byproduct of foreign policy. The latter is certainly more deleterious but 






 As with Thesis I, there does not seem to be anything that this information can realistically be 
applied to in order to achieve any sort of political reform. However, it can be used in order to 
further propagate objective information to the general public. 
 
3.7.3. Chapter III 
 Thesis III examined the implications that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had 
on a multitude of relevant countries. Some countries are directly involved with the deal and 
others are countries are highly impacted by the deal. The thesis compared the implications of 
each respective country or group of countries to the implications of JCPOA for the United States. 
It ultimately concluded that the United States had significantly less to risk than did other 
countries connected to JCPOA. Other countries that were involved with JCPOA, or connected to 
the deal through relational concerns, had similar security concerns that the United Stated did, but 
also had multiple other concerns as well: Iran’s well-being, economic relationships, weapons 
deals, and more immediate security concerns due to close proximity.  
 
 The main point that was drawn from this determination was that the United States had 
significantly less at stake- both from similar security angles in comparing Israel and the Gulf 
States as well as differing angles in comparing Europe, Russia, and China-than did other 
countries involved with or concerned by JCPOA. Therefore, it made it a lot easier for the Trump 
administration to oppose and withdraw from the deal. It was not only the fact that the United 
States had less at stake that led to the withdrawal, but also the isolationist style of diplomacy the 
Trump administration has implemented-as evidenced by this, as well as the large decrease in 





to generally a more aggressive approach to Iran that proves this stance. Ultimately, this means 
that the United States would not have withdrawn from JCPOA if either a different administration 
were in the White House or if the United States had more at stake concerning their relationship 
with Iran. 
 
 This comparative angle has not been discussed much at all. Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA 
is often explained as just Trump being either unhinged or tough, depending on the political 
perspective, but this thesis can be used to show that there probably was more strategy that went 
into the withdrawal than most would believe, whether one agrees with JCPOA or not. Perhaps 
this information can lead to more discussion of why exactly the United States would withdraw 
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